Report of the High Panel on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Imane Drissi El-Bouzaidi

October 7, 2012
The nature and origins of the Lebanese-Israeli Conflict, which ultimately led to the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978, are grounded in the more complex Arab Israeli conflict that has plagued the region in and around Israel for well over half a centure. Peace and security in Lebanon and the stabiliy of the region are mutually dependent; therefore, any hope for peace depends on the cessation of violence and unrest in the region as a whole. This report examines the histories and political context, the evolution of the mandate, and the successes and failures of hte UNIFIL mission in Southern Lebanon. After a review of the aspects of this peacekeeping mission, the Panel has outlined recommendations for the future of UNIFIL.


Historical Background

            Understanding the history behind the UNIFIL mission requires an analysis of how Israel and various other rival actors, notably the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), came into conflict with one another, and how this tied in with religious and political factions within Lebanon. Internal tensions within Lebanon coupled with instability in the surrounding countries gave the United Nations Security Council the impetus with which to initiate a peacekeeping operation in the region.

Following the end of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1948, Israel declared its independence within the original area of Palestine, after prolonged conflict between Jewish and Arab communities in the region. During the 1940 Arab-Israeli war, thousands of Palestinians fled and were expelled from the newly formed Jewish state.[i] Many of these refugees went to Lebanon while others went to Syria, Jordan and other Arab states. Since 1948, Palestinian refugees have played a major role in the political development of Lebanon.

The complexity of the political situation in Lebanon at the time further complicated the Palestinian exodus. Rivalries between Lebanon’s multi-religious population culminated in the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 (which continued until 1990) between the right-wing Phalange party, comprised mostly of Maronite Christians, and the Lebanese National Movement. Several groups in Lebanon, which, for the most part included leftists and Muslims, were calling for governmental reforms. This movement threatened to disrupt the precarious balance between the country’s religious communities. Many Lebanese felt that the Christian Maronites unjustly held high positions in the government, whereas Maronite Christians, who were traditionally pro-Western, feared that Muslims might become a majority in the country. In this volatile climate the Lebanese government pushed many Palestinians into refugee camps in Southern Lebanon. Palestinians made up 14% of Lebanon’s population and the Lebanese government’s response was to prevent Palestinians from becoming citizens for fear that this would disrupt Lebanon’s fragile balance between religious groups.[ii] The Palestinian presence in Southern Lebanon, along the border with Israel, ultimately led to the 1978 Israeli invasion and subsequent creation of UNIFIL.

In 1968, Palestinian refugees formed the PLO, with the stated objective of liberating Palestine. As the PLO movement grew more and more violent, Palestinian militants from Southern Lebanon began launching attacks into Israel. Between 1968 and 1978 violence on the Lebanese border between the PLO and Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) intensified. In March of that year, eleven Fatah members, a major component of the PLO, attacked an Israeli bus and killed 37 civilians. In direct retaliation, Israel launched an invasion of Lebanon, pushing as far north as the Litani River.[iii]

            In response to objections from the Lebanese government, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 and created UNIFIL in March 1978. The Security Council demanded that Israel withdraw from Lebanon.[iv] UNIFIL entered Lebanon to confirm an Israeli withdrawal and to assist Lebanese troops in patrolling the border. Although Israel withdrew in June, they transferred power to the South Lebanese Army (SLA), which consisted of Maronite Christians allied with Israel, under the command of Major Saad Haddad.[v] This move allowed Israel to withdraw its forces while still remaining allied to a proxy force that could fight the PLO.[vi] The continued fighting between the PLO and Christian-dominated SLA hindered UNIFIL’s capacity to fulfill its mandate, and thus, the Security Council continued to renew the operation’s mandate.

            The IDF came into direct conflict with the PLO once again in 1982 when they invaded Lebanon in response to a Palestinian assassination attempt of Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. The 1982 invasion was much more severe, with Israel pushing up as far as Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, and even occupying parts of the city. While the IDF eventually decreased its forces in 1985, the invasion prompted the PLO to relocate its headquarters from Lebanon to Tunisia.[vii]  The large power vacuum created by the PLO absence precipitated the formation of many nationalist, anti-Israeli Lebanese movements.[viii]  The PLO would no longer be a dominant force in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, but the coalescence of nationalist movements during the Israeli occupation eventually led to the formation of Hizbullah, a stridently anti-Israeli armed group and political party.[ix]

            Even with the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and periods of relative peace, deep-rooted historical conditions have hampered the mission’s abilities to fulfill its mandate. Ultimately, tensions between Israelis, Palestinians, Christian Lebanese, and Muslim Lebanese and other regional players are the direct product of a drawn-out and seemingly interminable conflict in which spoilers to the peace process continue to emerge.  Even with the expulsion of the PLO, conflicts have continued due to organizations like Hizbullah who continue to incite Israeli retaliation, thereby necessitating the ongoing UN presence.

         In response to continued pressures from Israeli citizens and in accordance with the 1978 UNIFIL mandate, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak ordered the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in June of 2000.[x] Upon this withdrawal, the United Nations instituted the “Blue Line”, a series of checkpoints that would serve as a mutually recognized border between Lebanon and Israel. The Blue Line between Southern Lebanon and Israel remains the official UN border and serves as an indicator as to whether each party is adhering to its commitments.

         The most recent conflict between Lebanon and Israel started on July 12^th 2006, when Hizbullah forces launched rockets from Southern Lebanon into Northern Israel, and captured two Israeli soldiers during a cross-border raid. Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described the capture as an “act of war” and the Israel Defense Force responded to these attacks by sending troops into Lebanon in order to retrieve the captured soldiers. The conflict then escalated as Israel implemented a naval blockade of Lebanon, commenced air strikes against Lebanese cities and a ground invasion. Another major cause of tensions in the region was the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. The assassination, believed to have been conducted by pro-Syrian elements, led to the expulsion of Syrian troops from Lebanon and deepened the division between Shiites and Sunnites. Some Lebanese believe that Israel could be responsible for the assassination, as they would have much to gain from a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.      

            Territorial disputes between Lebanon and Israel have not yet been resolved. Israel’s continued occupation of the town of Ghajar and the land disputes over Shebaa Farms, an area bordering Lebanon, Syria and Israel, remain contentious issues. A recent issue has been conflict over the massive natural gas reserves that were found in the offshore areas of Israel and Lebanon is dealt with. The area, known as the Levant Basin Province, contains the Leviathan gas field, which directly cuts through the contested Israeli-Lebanese maritime border.[xi] Violence on the Lebanese-Israeli border is also ongoing. As recently as August 1, 2011, Lebanese and Israeli troops exchanged fire over the Blue Line.  Furthermore, the limbo in which Palestinian refugees find themselves, as citizens of neither Lebanon, nor Israel, nor Palestine continues to contribute to instability in Southern Lebanon and the rest of the region.

Mission Mandate and Political Context of UNIFIL

UNIFIL’s mission mandate has undergone considerable changes since its creation in 1978, with concept changes in 1982 and 2000, as well as a complete mandate change in 2006. Resolution 425 dictated the initial mandate which was to “[confirm] the withdrawal of Israeli forces, [restore] international peace and security and [assist] the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area”.[xii] The hostile political environment meant that UNIFIL was unable to deploy into all of Southern Lebanon because certain areas were under the control of Palestinian groups, the IDF, and the South Lebanon Army, which effectively operated as an Israeli proxy force.[xiii]

During the 1982 Israeli invasion, UNIFIL remained a peacekeeping force while unsuccessfully attempting to slow the Israeli advance.[xiv] Meanwhile, Security Council Resolutions 511 and 519 authorized the mission to engage in humanitarian and administrative tasks and provide security for civilians.[xv] From 1985 to 2000, the situation remained tense, with ongoing low-intensity conflicts between the newly formed Hizbullah and Israeli/SLA forces. During this time, all parties to the conflict subjected UNIFIL troops to shootings, detentions, and kidnappings. Most notable was the shelling of a UN base in which the IDF killed over 100 Lebanese civilians.[xvi] For the first 22 years of its existence, UNIFIL was unable to fulfill the military components of its mandate, thus “…the de facto mandate became the provision of a secure environment for the local population”.[xvii]

On May 24th, 2000, Israel drastically changed the situation on the ground in Lebanon by withdrawing from southern Lebanon and thereby significantly improving UNFIL’s capacity to implement its mandate. Previously, UNIFIL could only act as a humanitarian mission but in 2000 it refocused its actions on fulfilling the latter stages of its mandate: restoring international peace and security and aiding the Lebanese Government in regaining its effective authority in the area. Israel claimed it withdrew to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 425 (1978), while some analysts attributed it to pressure from an increasingly unsupportive public.[xviii] Meanwhile, Hizbullah claimed that it deserved credit for Israel’s withdrawal.[xix]

In 2000 the SLA disbanded, thereby eliminating one party from the conflict and, to a small extent, simplifying the situation. However, the political context at this time was complicated by geopolitical interests, alliances, and conflicts in the Middle East and their inextricable link to Lebanese stability. Although the presence of Palestinian refugees remains prominent in Lebanon, there has been a gradual change in the actors involved, from the PLO and SLA to Hizbullah and a strengthened Lebanese Army. Palestinian attacks on Israel and subsequent Israeli invasions serve as a constant reminder of how strongly stability in Lebanon is dependent upon a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another political consideration of UNIFIL emerged in 2001, when Lebanon began pumping water from the Jordan River to a Lebanese town.[xx] Israel opposed this action and threatened Lebanon with military force. This dispute epitomizes how the geopolitics of the region have complicated UNIFIL’s mission.

The UNSC voted to change UNIFIL’s mandate in 2006. The current mandate is to: “monitor the cessation of hostilities... help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, assist the [Lebanese Armed Forces] in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area....”.[xxi] Prior to this mandate change, use of force was limited to self-defense; however, since 2006, the UNSC has authorized UNIFIL to take “all necessary action” to implement the mandate and maintain security.[xxii] There has also been a change in budget from the initial 68 million USD[xxiii] to the new budget of over 500 million USD.[xxiv] To achieve this mission, the total mandated troop force increased from 5,931 in 1978 to 15,000 troops in 2006, although only 12,349 uniformed personnel are currently deployed. The troops come from 36 different countries, of which the five biggest contributors are Italy, Indonesia, France, Spain and Nepal.[xxv] These international troops are employed alongside approximately 15,000 members of the Lebanese Armed Forces.[xxvi] In response to the mandate’s new mission to control the entry of arms and related materials, the UN created a Maritime Task Force to prevent the unauthorized entry of arms into Lebanon by sea. The creation of this maritime component to a mission is a first in UN history.

            In the implementation of the mandate after 2006, UNIFIL has had to manage a difficult political climate in Lebanon due to issues of impartiality, prospective contributors, regional politics, and the politics of neighbouring states. Maintaining consent and impartiality has been complicated by opposing interests and concerns over UNIFIL. Choosing contributing nations has major political implications because in order for UNIFIL to be effective there must be a balance between European and Muslim states. The number of Muslim Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)/Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) has been limited and only one Arab state, Qatar, has played a role but withdrew in 2008. This was a political challenge because Qatar’s involvement represented Arab support for the peacekeeping mission and since then, UNIFIL has still been unable to secure another Arab TCC.[xxvii] Israel has resisted the involvement of many Muslim states but encouraged Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey (although only Turkey chose to get involved).  In 2010, when Indonesia was being considered for the position of Force commander, Israel strongly protested because Indonesia does not recognize Israel and they have no diplomatic ties. To date, there have been no commanders from Muslim states in either the peacekeeping or Maritime Task force.

            Other political considerations involve regional issues and actors. Firstly, Hizbullah’s role as a major actor in southern Lebanon has led UNIFIL to emphasize the importance of receiving the group’s consent. Hizbullah has based its support of the mandate on three conditions; UNIFIL must cooperate with the Lebanese army rather than act unilaterally; UNIFIL cannot place troops in all of Lebanon, only south of the Litani River; and lastly, UNIFIL cannot search Hizbullah for weapons although they can remove arms if they come across any.[xxviii]  UNIFIL’s approach to Hizbullah has been politically contentious because Israel and some TCCs label it a terrorist organization and believe that negotiation should not be an option.[xxix]        

UNIFIL has also had to consider regional geopolitical issues that have emerged over the maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon.[xxx] This area is strongly disputed due to the recent discovery of underwater natural gas reserves. The politics of neighbouring states have become further complicated with the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. Some states that appear to be funding and arming Hizbullah may face a change in their policies towards Lebanon depending on whether a new government forms. This new political environment will dictate whether there will be changes in UNIFIL’s actions, such as whether troops can be deployed on the border with Syria.

Successes, failures and challenges ahead

After more than thirty years in Lebanon, UNIFIL’s achievements are ambiguous and the challenges it faces are substantial. While its very prolonged presence along the Lebanese-Israeli border might be interpreted as an indication of the important role it plays in the conflict, its permanence also implies that the conditions for a withdrawal have not yet been achieved. The aforementioned changes to the mandate and the volatile and tense regional environment further attest to the complexity of the conflict and, therefore, the difficulties that UNIFIL faces in Lebanon.

            Political tension is still common in Lebanon, where the government faces difficulties establishing its legitimacy and credibility. Its attempts to exercise authority have been met with fierce opposition by the concerned parties. When such situations have arisen, the response has been to force a stalemate in government by forcing it to collapse. Each party’s ability to unilaterally force a stalemate can cause the government to lose its legitimacy and credibility in carrying out its functions, which in turn reinforces the belief that the government can continue to be manipulated. As a result of these difficulties, Lebanon cannot address its obligation in the mission’s mandate.

            This inability of the Lebanese government to perform its functions leaves UNIFIL in a very difficult position. While the mandate dictates that UNIFIL should assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in exerting control over their territory and their borders, it does not authorize UNIFIL to replace the Lebanese army in these matters. However, it is unclear whether the Lebanese army has been able to perform these tasks.[xxxi] As a result, UNIFIL faces a “lose-lose” situation: if it decides to actively monitor Lebanon’s borders and perform tasks that in theory should be carried out by the Lebanese army, it would be transgressing its mandate. On the other hand, limiting its activities to the supporting role, as assigned by the mandate, would make it very difficult for UNIFIL to meaningfully contribute to the creation of a secure and stable environment.  In general, respecting the sovereignty of the Lebanese government has continued to be UNIFIL’s strategy, which explains why it is unable to effectively implement an arms embargo until the Lebanese government agrees to give consent.

In addition to the lack of progress in the political arena, Lebanon continues to face diplomatic challenges with Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. A definite border between Lebanon and Syria has yet to be agreed upon, and disputes continue to occur over Israel’s over flights into Lebanese territory. On issues of diplomacy, the secretary-general has advised the governments of Lebanon, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to engage in renewed talks. However, little progress has been made on both issues. This regional tension also renders UNIFIL tasks more complicated. The lack of trust between the parties is certainly a challenge for UNIFIL, which needs to keep good relations with the actors while maintaining its impartial position in the conflict.

Another source of conflict between Israel and Lebanon is Hizbullah’s role in the region. Although in 2006 the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 calling for “the immediate cessation by Hizbullah of all attacks (against Israel),”[xxxii] in August 2011 the UNIFIL mandate was renewed for an additional year due to two recent Hizbullah attacks on UNIFIL troops.[xxxiii] It has become increasingly clear that Resolution 1701 has not been fully implemented over the past five years and concerns over violence from Hizbullah are escalating as UNIFIL troops are attacked. Lack of progress in disarming Hizbullah creates increased danger for UNIFIL troops as well as Lebanese civilians.

Israeli officials have been very vocal in what they feel is a lack of action by UNIFIL.  As Ambassador Haim Waxman, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN, stated at the August 30th Mandate renewal, UNIFIL has been doing nothing to stop the arms embargo and has even allowed Hizbullah to set up camp on their territory.[xxxiv] Hizbullah’s use of civilians represents a growing concern, as they mask their attacks under the guise of civilian action, thereby preventing UNIFIL from taking action against the organization.[xxxv] Hizbullah’s use of civilian disguises complicates the mission’s role: without being able to clearly differentiate members of Hizbullah from real civilians, it is nearly impossible for UNIFIL to enforce its mandate.

Other obstacles to UNIFIL’s mission have been Israel’s “offensive military operations” in Lebanon in 2006 and refusals to comply with Resolution 1701.[xxxvi] The Israeli military operation has caused civilian deaths and violated Lebanese sovereignty. The 2006 attacks, loss of lives, and Hizbullah’s defensive operations could lead many Lebanese to support the Islamic group for its actions in defending Lebanese territorial sovereignty.[xxxvii] Like Hizbullah and other actors, Israel needs to respect the Blue Line and civilian life. Furthermore, a complete withdrawal from Lebanon has yet to occur; Israel is still occupying Norther Ghajar which directly prevents UNIFIL from fulfilling its mandate and creates a serious obstacle for a permanent peace.

Although UNIFIL faces difficulties at the strategic level because of the aforementioned tensions, it certainly deserves praise for its work with the local community. As mentioned in the second part of this document, with resolution 1701, UNIFIL’s mandate was extended to ensure the protection of civilians and allow the local community to have access to humanitarian assistance. Since then, UNIFIL’s Civil Affairs sector has become the main interface between UNIFIL and the local community. Civil Affairs activities allow the Lebanese people to learn more about UNIFIL’s mandate and its current operations.  At the same time, Civil Affairs promotes the participation of UNIFIL in local events and ensures that the mission’s operations do not affect normal daily life in the area. Different contingents from the mission regularly hold different programs for the community to get involved, such as language classes, yoga, taekwondo and bread making, among others.[xxxviii] These simple, low-cost programs can have a significant positive impact on the local community. This positive impact ultimately leads to the establishment of a friendlier environment in which UN staff can perform their duties with more ease. Furthermore, this support from the local population contributes to the preservation of the mission’s legitimacy.  Despite the general progress in the mission’s legitimacy and credibility, some incidents have had a considerably negative impact on the relations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese people. For instance, tensions arose over UNIFIL’s failure to consult and coordinate with the Lebanese Army when carrying out its Maximum Deployment Exercise in 2010.

On the other hand, UNIFIL has not been as effective in more complicated, risky and costly tasks, such as demining. There are currently 22 million square meters covered with landmines in Lebanon.[xxxix] Another issue that UNIFIL will most likely need to address in the future is the growing tension between Palestinian refugees and Lebanese people. Palestinian refugees are banned from working in most professional fields in Lebanon, which generates discomfort in the present and might become a source of conflict in the future.

As previously stated, Resolution 1701 also authorized an increase in the number of troops to up to 15 000. Several Western European nations, particularly France, Italy and Spain, responded to the UN call and decided to contribute large contingents. After several decades of declining troop contributions to PKO missions by these countries, the UN welcomed their decision to take a central role in UNIFIL. Their presence brings technical and military expertise to the mission, as well as well-equipped and trained soldiers. In addition, the involvement of European powers in UNIFIL gives the mission a symbolic importance that it would otherwise not have.

However, European powers’ participation in UNIFIL has also been a source of conflict in the mission. Concerned about the high risks that their troops would face in Lebanon, these countries –notably France- demanded more freedom of action for their soldiers and decided to deploy heavy tanks to the area. This is highly problematic as it undermines the peacekeeping nature of the mission, which is meant to be non-hostile and not threatening.[xl] The presence of these countries has therefore created a gap between the mandate of the mission and the role that some powerful countries within it have assumed unilaterally. This lack of cohesion among the different contingents is an issue that needs to be addressed in the future. While 12 000 troops is an adequate number for the mission given the size of the theatre of operations, the fragmentation into several, independent national contingents prevents UNIFIL from successfully accomplishing its mission. Contingents need to work together in such a way that their missions complement each other and, ultimately, lead to the enforcement of the mandate.

Recommendations

Following the review of conflict history, mission strategies, and barriers to success, there are a number of areas in which UNIFIL can improve. The aforementioned concerns about the safety of the region and humanitarian conditions necessitate diplomatic action as well as internal measures Lebanon and Israel can take to help improve UNIFIL’s success.

The problems faced by UNIFIL are inextricably linked to larger regional issues with deep-rooted alliances, tensions, and interests. In order for UNIFIL to successfully carry out its mandate, communication between UNIFIL and other UN operations in the Middle East should be strengthened. Information and intelligence sharing related to troop movements, developments on the ground, and overall mission strategy and policy between UNIFIL, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syria will deepen each mission’s awareness of the regional context in which it operates. UN peacekeepers cannot implement their mission’s mandate without an understanding of and appreciation for the local and regional history, alliances, tensions, and relations. An increased dialogue between the various UN missions operating in the Middle East will give peacekeepers the tools to enact their mandate in a more regionally appropriate manner.

        Perhaps the most significant regional issue that UNIFIL headquarters, commanders, and peacekeepers must be aware of is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Palestinians’ desire for a sovereign homeland, coupled with Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories,[xli] precipitated the need for a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon. Palestinians do not have a state and are living in over-crowded refugee camps; for as long as this situation continues some Palestinians will resort to violence. Therefore, an awareness of the peace process, its actors, hurdles, and accomplishments, is central to an effective UNIFIL force. UNIFIL should support a peace process which aims towards the creation of a Palestinian State and addresses Israel’s security concerns.

Further action can be taken to promote the safety and security of the region both on the ground and around the Lebanese borders.  The presence of Israeli landmines and clusterbombs throughout Southern Lebanon poses a grave danger not only to the safety of Lebanese citizens and UNIFIL personnel but also to the preservation of peace.  Events such as the detonation of a landmine have the potential to incite or intensify the conflict, which UNIFIL is mandated to cease.  In order to achieve this, UN personnel must be given free passage throughout the region.  Militant groups within Lebanon, such as Hizbullah, must engage in efforts to minimize interference with UNIFIL’s demining activities.  Further to this, Hizbullah should be encouraged to focus on its political gains through dialogue and negotiations rather than military action.  UNIFIL can take measures to enforce the demilitarization of militant groups by engaging the Syrian government in an effort to gain authorization for patrols along the Lebanon-Syria border.  As exemplified by the success of the Blue Line operations, patrols along the Syrian border could prevent the further entry of arms into Lebanon and would undoubtedly increase the security of the region.

Humanitarian action is critical to maintaining the support of the local population. From 1987 to the present, UNIFIL troops have been engaged in humanitarian work in Southern Lebanon through the provision of schools and medical facilities, as well as the facilitation of the return of displaced people.[xlii] As a result of UNIFIL’s humanitarian work, the mission’s personnel have developed a close and friendly relationship with the Southern Lebanese people.[xliii] For this reason, it is important that UNIFIL carry on and strengthen its commitment to humanitarian aid. In order to do so, it is important for UNIFIL to work closely with UNDP Lebanon, as well as other humanitarian agencies already in the region. The main focus of UNIFIL’s humanitarian work should be to work with UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees living in camps in Southern Lebanon, as their current living conditions cause frustration amongst the refugees, which can lead to violence. 

These recommendations should serve as a framework for UNIFIL discussions but should remain be flexible enough to adjust to the dynamic nature of the conflict.  Focus should remain on diplomatic negotiations, the safety and security of citizens in the region and humanitarian concerns, particularly the repatriation of Palestinian refugees (as outlined in UN General Assembly Resolution 194). Continual reviews of the mission are necessary in order to ensure the successful progression towards completion of the mandate.     

           

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[i] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a History with Documents. 7th ed. (New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2009), 227.

[ii] Karim Makdisi, “Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 For Lebanon in the Shadow of the ‘‘war On Terror’’,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 1 (02/01/2011): 15-16.

[iii] United Nations. “UNIFIL Background.” United Nations Peacekeeping. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml (accessed October 5, 2011).

[iv] Ibid

[v] Timur Goksel, “Mr. Unifil Reflects On a Quarter Century of Peacekeeping,” Journal of Palestine Studies 36, no. 3 (Spring 2007): 50-51.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Facts, Palestine. “Israel Campaign in Lebanon 1982-1985.” Palestine Facts. http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_lebanon_198x_idf_course.php (accessed October 5, 2011).

[viii] BBC News, “Who Are Hezbollah?” BBC News, July 4, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4314423.stm.  Accessed October 6, 2011.

[ix] BBC News, “Q & A: Leaving Lebanon,” BBC News, May 23, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/636594.stm (accessed October 7, 2011).

[x] BBC source

[xi] “August 2011 Lebanon Report,” Security Council Report,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.7634825/k.15A/August_2011brLebanon.htm (accessed October 7, 2011).

[xii] United Nations, “Security Council Resolutions 1978,” Accessed September 25, 2011, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1978/scres78.htm.

[xiii] Timur Goksel, ““Mr. UNIFIL” reflects on a Quarter Century of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon”, 53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2007.36.3.50

[xiv] Ibid, 66.

[xv] United Nations, “Security Council Resolutions 1982,” Accessed September 20, 2011, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1982/scres82.htm.

[xvi] UNIFIL Video, UNIFIL, accessed September 25, 2011, http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?grm2catid=295&tabid=1513.

[xvii] Murphy, UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice, 105.

[xviii] “The Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/The+Israeli+Withdrawal+from+Southern+Lebanon-+Back.htm (accessed October 7, 2011).

[xix] Ibid

[xx] Zafrir Rinat, “Lebanon's Proposed Water Station Pumps up the Tension,” Independent Media Review and Analysis, http://www.kokhavivpublications.com/2001/israel/mar/15/0103150002.html (accessed October 7, 2011).

[xxi] “Resolution 1701,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1701%282006%29 (accessed October 6, 2011).

[xxii]  Ibid

[xxiii]  “Unifil Facts and Figures,” United Nations Peacekeeping,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/facts.shtml (accessed October 6, 2011).

[xxiv] “UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries,” UN Missions,http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4879 (accessed October 6, 2011).

[xxv]  UN Resolution 1701

[xxvi] Ibid

[xxvii] “Viewing Cable: Qatar Leaving Unifil,” Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/02/08STATE12556.html (accessed October 7, 2011).

[xxviii] Timur Goksel, “Unifil: Peacekeepers in the Line of Fire,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung Middle East (August 07, 2007): 3.

[xxix]  Ibid 5

[xxx] “August 2011 Lebanon Report,” Security Council Report,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.7634825/k.15A/August_2011brLebanon.htm (accessed October 7, 2011).

[xxxi] Karim Makdisi, “Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 For Lebanon in the Shadow of the ‘‘war On Terror’’,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 1 (02/01/2011): 15-16.

[xxxii] “Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General On the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004),” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/258 (accessed September 20, 2011).

[xxxiii]“August 2011 Lebanon,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.7634825/k.15A/August_2011brLebanon.htm (accessed September 20, 2011).

[xxxiv] Haim Waxman, “Unifil Mandate Renewal,” Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, http://www.israel-un.org/statements-at-the-united-nations/security-council/379-unifil-mandate-renewal- (accessed September 20, 2011).

[xxxv] “Security Council Authorizes One-year Mandate Extension for United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in Wake of Attacks on Peacekeepers”. United Nations. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10373.doc.htm (accessed September 20, 2011).

[xxxvi] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a History with Documents. 7th ed. (New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2009), 540.

[xxxvii] “Security Council Calls For End to Hostilities between Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701 (2006).” Department of Public Information, News and Media Division. United Nations, N.d. Web. 6 Oct. 2011. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm>.

[xxxviii] “UNIFIL Civil Interaction,” UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1520 (accessed October 5, 2011).

[xxxix] Dalila Mahdawi, “Israel’s Cluster Bombs Continue to Kill and Maim in Lebanon.” Electronic Intifada http://electronicintifada.net/content/israels-cluster-bombs-continue-kill-and-maim-lebanon/10376#.TovwWcn2bpA (accessed October 5, 2011).

[xl] Ronald Hatto, “Un Command and Control Capabilities: Lessons from Unifil’s Strategic Military Cell,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (04/2009): 186-98.

[xli] “UN Chief: Israel's Occupation Is 'morally, politically unsustainable'.” International News. Haaretz. N.p., 30 Mar. 2011. Web. 7 Oct. 2011. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/un-chief-israel-s-occupation-is-morally-politically-unsustainable-1.352758>.

[xlii] Goksel, “Mr. UNIFIL”, 76.

[xliii] Ibid 77.