April 11, 2011
Morocco
has long been praised internationally for being “politically moderate with the
best potential in the Arab world for becoming truly democratic.”[1]
The US ambassador to Morocco stated that it “is the best democratic experiment
that currently is going on in the Middle East” and George Bush said that “the
historic steps Morocco has taken toward political, economic, and social
modernization demonstrate its strength and reinforce its standing in the
community of nations.”[2]
This country has undergone considerable changes in the last two decades, with major
improvements in the economy as well as in minority and women’s rights. The
decline in poverty has been especially significant with Morocco decreasing from
having 30.4 percent of people living on less than two dollars a day in 1990, to
8 percent in 2008.[3] However,
it is premature to celebrate these achievements because despite these praises, Morocco’s
political system is underdeveloped and reform is seriously lacking. This paper
will argue that the process of democratization in Morocco has faced many
shortcomings due to the fact that political reforms have largely been illusory
and neglected. The essay will be devised in three parts to show the process of
democratization that Morocco has undertaken. The first part will explain the
positive reforms that have been enacted; the second part will focus on the inadequacies
of these reforms; and the third part will explore guidelines for what is needed
for future political reforms.
To begin, the history of
democratization in Morocco will be outlined starting from the rule of King
Hassan II, which is when major reforms began. When the king came to power he ruled
Morocco repressively and with complete control. The monarch could appoint ministers,
dissolve parliament, sign treaties, and more. All opposition was suppressed
with arrests, torture, and disappearances, including those from the media,
newspapers, and political opposition. The attempted military coups in the 1970s
increased this state of repression in the country. King Hassan II created a
mega prison, Tazmamaat, to imprison the political dissidents, coup conspirers,
and those from the two largest political opposition parties, Istiqlal and the
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP).[4]
Violence from the state escalated once again when the war in the Western Sahara
began in 1975. This was between Morocco and the Sahrawi Polisario Front and led
to more suppression by the state with disappearances, torture, and arrests
being made. This period of repression, (throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s), is
often referred to as the “Years of Lead.”[5]
Following these developments, King Hassan II changed directions and began
allowing a limited degree of reforms.
The democratic reforms began in the
1990s with Hassan II and continued when King Mohammed VI came to power in 1999.
These developments can be distinguished as economic reforms, human rights
reforms, and political reforms. The economic reforms consisted of a major
program of liberalization and privatization. The state’s commercial ties to the
West were increased, the tax system was reorganized, and new infrastructure was
built. Economic growth and reforms in Morocco continued to develop in the
twenty-first century, despite the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis. That year
Morocco`s economy grew by 4.9%, while countries around the world were
experiencing a major decline.[6]
But the most important economic challenge was corruption, which became rampant
everywhere in Morocco. King Hassan II began combating corruption in the late
1990s with the Prime Minister, Abderrahmane Youssoufi.[7]
King Mohammed VI continued this by making overtures for encouraging
transparency. He signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003, he passed
legislation that allowed civil society and newspapers to address the issue of corruption,
and in 2008 individuals holding public office were required to enumerate their
assets in order to make the process more transparent.[8]
Institutions were implemented for the purpose of curbing corruption, such as
the Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption.[9]
And finally, there was an attempt to prevent future corruption by targeting the
youth. Classes in school began teaching the dangers of corruption and how it
has a destructive effect on the state.
The next combination of reforms concern
human rights. Numerous international human rights conventions were passed, such
as the 1993 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child[10].
Major developments were then made to the family status codes, beginning with
Hassan II and completed with Mohammed VI, which affected women’s rights. This
reformation of the mudawwana changed the marriageable age from 15 to 18 years
old, it allowed women the ability to divorce by mutual consent, it limited the
ability to practice polygamy, and it changed the idea that a wife’s duty is
obedience to a system of joint responsibility between the husband and wife.[11]
Women were also declared equal before
the law and given the ability to pass on citizenship to their children while
being married to a foreigner.[12]
Another human rights development was that Mohammed VI tried to acknowledge the
atrocities that his father committed, which was “an unprecedented initiative in
the Arab world” made “all the more notable because the government so exposed
was not that of a tyrant fallen from power, but that of the king’s father.”[13]
The king formed the Independent Arbitration Panel in 1999, which heard
individual cases in order to compensate and pay reparations to the victims that
suffered under his father’s rule[14].
Approximately four thousand people were compensated until 2003 when it was
disbanded and replaced with Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER), which was
another institution that replaced the Independent Arbitration Panel to continue
the process of compensation and exposing previous abuses. Mohammed VI also
created the 2005 National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), which
focused on making sure that resources were distributed correctly and that
people were not excluded from resources, and ultimately development.[15]
In general, these institutions and reforms led to more inclusion for women,
minorities, and it allowed there to be reconciliation for abuses committed in
the past by the state.
The last group of reforms that are
important to outline are political reforms. Compared to the other two reforms,
political changes were mainly neglected and ineffective. One of the first major
reforms occurred when Hassan II amended the constitution in 1992 and 1996. In
1996 Morocco’s unicameral parliament was changed to a bicameral body when an
elected lower chamber was formed.[16]
The lower house was supposed to represent the Moroccan citizens, whereas, the
upper house represented locals and elites because they were elected by regional
assemblies and professional organizations.[17]
Another policy that was supposed to lead to political reforms was that of
“alternance.”[18]
This was the attempt to increase political participation by including other
parties and bringing them into government. An example of this was in 1997 when
he brought in the opposition political party, USFP, to form the government.
Morocco has allowed multiple states to participate in the political system. These
policies were very contentious and ineffective, which will now be discussed.
Inadequacy of
Reforms:
The economic, human rights, and political reforms in
Morocco all faced shortcomings to a certain extent, mainly due to political
issues that undermine the reforms that are made in human rights and the economy.
Economic changes were successful to a degree but there were still many issues
apparent and which still persist today. The most significant issue is the
failure to reform corruption. In 2010, the minister of public sector
modernisation, Mohamed Saad, calculated that corruption devastated
approximately two percent of GDP; it prevented economic growth, and made
investments difficult to maintain.[19] The 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index
gave Morocco a score of 3.5 out of 10 and its ranking declined from 72nd
place to the 80th position[20].
The main reason for this failure to curb corruption is because there is no
political will for change, seeing as corruption is beneficial for the monarch.
Hassan II used corruption as a strategy for political and economic control
throughout the 1980s.[21]
He was able to eliminate any opposition and competitors by buying them off or
using his economic power to bolster support for his regime through powerful
individuals, such as military officers and members of the security force.
Although there were efforts for change since the 1990s, ultimately Mohammed VI has
not managed his businesses any differently. Political problems and the role of
the king are at the root of the problem of corruption because “the involvement
of the monarch in the private sector has exacerbated old transparency-related
problems.”[22] The
king is the main businessman and largest landowner in Morocco. His involvement
in the economy and that of his allies creates an environment susceptible to
corruption. There are three major reasons for this. Firstly, when the king is
involved, people are more hesitant to expose any corruption that may exist.
Also there is less transparency and accountability when the monarch is
involved. This may even lead to diminished competition because people would be
hesitant to compete against an endeavour that the monarch has interests in.[23]
The last reason is that those that have close connections with the monarch,
such as members of the armed forces and security agencies, benefit from a
variety of unfair advantages. Many continue to use their political connections
to deny others the opportunity to compete with them on a level playing field.
There are also major problems with the institutions meant to target corruption.
The 2007 Central Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (ACPC), which was
created to curb corruption, is limited for many reasons. Firstly, the fact that
it does not have independence from the government is generally criticized
because it is tied to the Prime Minister’s Office, which is often
pro-monarchical. [24] This
greatly hinders the institution because external pressure can compromise the
effectiveness of the body. Another issue is that it was meant to function solely
for consultation rather than “to initiate legal proceedings or to launch
inquiries.”[25] The
fact that the judiciary is also rife with corruption explains the difficulty in
using institutions to combat corruption.
The human rights reforms in Morocco also
have had major shortcomings. Again it is evident that political issues are
responsible for these inadequacies. The process of implementing reforms is
still dominated by an authoritarian process, in which the king responds “to the
reform agenda by hand-picking royal commissions to study the issues and then
implementing policy changes on his own terms.”[26]
Although there has been an opening up of the media, control and repression by
the state is still apparent. The Ministry of Interior has to approve all civic
associations; therefore, those that the monarch does not find acceptable will occasionally
be limited. As Freedom House explains, Moroccan authorities use the repressive
press legislation, economic power, or internet censorship to deter and punish
journalists from critiquing the monarchy.[27]
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has labelled Morocco as well as
Tunisia as the “leading jailer of journalists” in the Arab world.[28]
The institution of Instance Equité Réconciliation (IER) is also limited in its
scope of human rights reform. The problem with IER is that it failed to bring
the perpetrators to justice; it had a short deadline so it was not a
comprehensive assessment and many were not reconciled.[29]
There was also a high level of hypocrisy because authorities allowed discussion
about human rights violations between 1956 and 1999, but would not tolerate
critique of King Mohammed VI. This was not reasonable because violations were
still occurring during the rule of Mohammed VI, especially the repression disguised
as the fight against the “war on terror.” The current administration still does
not tolerate critique, which was apparent in June 2008 when a Moroccan court
ordered the newspaper, Al-Jarida al-Oula, not to publish testimonies from the
IER anymore[30].
Neglected Political
Reforms
Although the economic and human
rights reforms have certain shortcomings, Morocco’s development is still
characterized as “authoritarian liberalism.”[31]
This is the process of having liberalized without including political reforms.
The lack of political reforms is at the root of many structural issues within
Morocco because control still resides mainly with the king. Enshrined in the
1996 constitution, the monarch can appoint ministers in parliament, veto
legislation, dissolve parliament, and more. The change to a bicameral system
served to bolster the position of the monarch. The fact that there are two
chambers allows both to act as “an institutional check on each other’s actions’
and mechanism for avoiding legislative excess.”[32]
Each would remain weakened and could not be strong enough and would not be able
to acquire a wide base of support in order to present effective opposition to
the monarchy. The strategy to weaken opposition is also evident with the
implementation of a multiparty state. The multiparty system is more illusory
than democratic because all the political parties are supportive of the
monarchy or they are consequently excluded. Therefore, although parties exist
they can only govern as long as it is sanctioned by the king. When the king
incorporated political parties into the government this decreased their
legitimacy among the Moroccan public. Division and cooption was used as a
strategy in order to maintain this control over the political parties. Traditional
opposition parties, such as Istiqlal and USFP, were co-opted and thereby only
ruled in accordance with the monarchy.[33]
He used a multiparty state to ensure that political parties were weak and
divided and in some cases he acted to exacerbate this division by playing
parties against each other. For example, Hassan in 1990 allowed an Islamic
party to run solely because the Left party was becoming too powerful. He even
created a pro-monarchy party, Mouvement Populaire (MP) in order to balance the
rise of the Leftist parties. This
allowed King Hassan II maintain hegemony and remain unchecked because “the
parties play an important role in deflecting criticism of the monarchy’s
policies and in drawing away support for more radical elements and the
military.”[34]
King Mohammed VI has also shown
that he does not respect the democratic process but rather he has merely
adopted the same strategy of division and cooption. An example of this
commonplace division was with the 2002 elections. Rather than creating a united
secular party that could act as an alternative to monarchical rule, twenty-five
secular parties competed with twenty-one winning seats.[35]
In this same election, the king chose to appoint the Prime Minister despite the
election results. Some political parties that refuse to accept the present
monarchical system, such as the Association of Justice and Charity, are banned
as a result and excluded from participating in the democratic process[36].
This has created a lack of competition in the system. Some parties are taking
steps to limit themselves for fear of exclusion. For example, in 2009 the
Islamist party, the Justice and Development party (PJD), received the third
highest number of seats in parliament; however, they chose to only run in
fifty-five out of ninety-one constituencies. [37]
The party’s choice to limit themselves came from Algeria’s reaction to ban the
Islamic party when it won a majority in government, as well as a decision to
protest against the injustice of the political process.
The political system in Morocco
has not improved but instead Freedom House indicates that the state has
“received a downward trend due to the increased concentration of power in the
hands of political elites aligned with the monarchy.”[38]
The close associate of King Mohammed VI, Fouad Ali el-Himma, created the
Modernity and Authenticity Party, which ended up winning the 2009 elections,
thereby allowing the monarch to have more control over the government. Alongside
this, the elections are fraught with evidence of vote buying, harassment, and
electoral manipulation. In 2010, a member of the PJD political party, Mustapha
Ramid, resigned from his position because of pressure from external powers as
well as what he viewed as the marginalisation of political powers in parliament.[39]
As a result, the public has become disaffected by the entire electoral system
and in the 2007 elections, only thirty-seven percent of the electorate chose to
vote.[40]
Ultimately the public has decided that the parties they elect will not have an
effect on public policy so there is no rational reason to vote. In the third
section the paper will discuss what a more effective response should be by a
disaffected public in order to push for political reform.
Guidelines to Reform:
In order to determine the best
method of achieving political reform, one needs to analyze why the reforms were
enacted in the past and continue using that same strategy to push for reforms. The
beginning process of democratization in Morocco arose from two factors:
external and domestic pressure. The External influence came from a variety of
influences. Firstly, the end of the Cold War created a new environment where
democratization was internationally popular. Another factor was that King
Hassan II’s human rights violations led to international condemnation and
distancing by Western powers who were important economic partners for Morocco.
In 1992 the European parliament denied the state an aid package as a result.
Regional precedent became a factor for the king’s decision as well because a
civil war emerged in Algeria when the results of the election were not
respected.[41] Domestic
pressure also had a major impact on putting pressure on the monarch because
during the 1980s, major droughts occurred.[42]
Rural labourers began moving into the cities, creating major pressure due to
unemployment, poverty, and social discontent. In order to appease the
population and make sure that his son be ensured succession to the throne, King
Hassan II decided to comply and implement economic, human rights, and limited
political reforms. Pressure for reforms should arise from the bottom-up by the
population in order to garner significant weight. The monarch will not
willingly relinquish his power so the masses must be strong and united in their
stance. Leaders are often hesitant to offer reforms because it is not in their
personal interest and it is sometimes thought that states have fallen because
they have implemented reforms. The country and political parties must try to
unite and create a strong alternative to monarchical rule and that which cannot
be co-opted or divided by the king. The final outlook must include independent
institutions, such as a separate legislative, executive, and judicial system. Therefore,
learning lessons from the past will be an important strategy to adopt when
pushing for new political reforms.
In conclusion, by analyzing Moroccan
democratic reforms, it is evident that political reform has not been successful
but rather it has remained unchanged over the years. Although Morocco is often
praised for its undergoing major democratic developments, in reality there is
much improvement to be made on economic, human rights, and most especially
political issues. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2010 “Index of Democracy”
displayed Morocco as an authoritarian regime with a score of 3.79 out of 10 for
its level of democracy.[43]
However, this is not to say that democratic reform is not possible but rather
that it is necessary. Protests by the disaffected Moroccan masses beginning in February
2011, proves that reform is possible and that it may soon be achieved. In order
to appease the public, Mohammed VI made a statement on March 9, 2011 to offer
constitutional reforms, which would limit his power. As Moroccans continue to protest,
it is important to remember that this authoritarian system has not and cannot
continue to work. Real democratic reform is necessary so that we can no longer
say: “plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.”[44]
[1]
John P. Entelis, “The Unchanging
Politics of North Africa,” Middle East
Policy, Volume 14, No. 4, published November 27 (Winter 2007) 34.
[2] Yahia H. Zoubir and Fernández Haizam Amirah, North Africa: Politics,
Region, and the Limits of Transformation, (London:
Routledge, 2008) 282.
[3] Lahcen Achy, “Morocco’s Experience with
Poverty Reduction: Lessons for the Arab World,” Carnegie Middle East Center, No. 25, (December 2010) 2.
[4] Dafna
Hochman, "Divergent Democratization: The Paths of Tunisia, Morocco and
Mauritania," Middle East Policy, 14.4 (2007) 69.
[5] Abdallah, Shalaby, Towards a Better Life:
How to Improve the State of Democracy in the Middle East (Istanbul:
Istanbul Kultur University 2010) 38.
[6]
“The Report: Morocco 2011,” Oxford Business Group, (2010) accessed April 4,
2011 <http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/full_content/report-morocco-2011>
31.
[7]
Guilain P. Denoeux, “Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way
Forward,” Middle East Policy, Vol 14, No. 4 (Winter 2007) 140.
[8]“The
Report: Morocco 2011,” 44.
[9]
Ibid
[10]
Ottaway 7
[11]
Ottaway 8
[12]
“The Report: morocco 2011” 19.
[13]
Ibid
[14]
Lise Storm, “Democratization in Morocco: The Political Elite and struggles for
Power in the Post-Independence State,” (London: Routledge, 2007) 102.
[17]
Baldwin 136.
[18]
Ottaway 6
[19]
“The Report: Morocco 2011,”44.
[20] Benmehdi, Hassan. "Morocco Plagued by Corruption, New
Survey Reveals,” Magharebia.com, 10
Feb. 2009. Wed. 05 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2009/02/10/feature-02>.
[21]
Denoeux 139
[22]
Denoeux 134
[23] Denoeux 138
[24] Denoeux 146
[25] Sarah Touahri , "Morocco to Launch Anti-corruption Authority
(Magharebia.com)," Magharebia.com, 26 Aug. 2008, Web. 1 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2008/08/26/feature-03>
[26] Ottaway 10
[27] "Morocco Country
Report." Freedom House. 2010.
Web. 1 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7881>.
[28] Entelis 37
[29]
Ottaway 7
[30]
Ottaway 7
[31]
Sabri Sayari, Democratization in the
Middle East: Trends and Prospects, Washington: National Academy of Sciences
(1994) 9.
[32]Baldwin
138
[33]
Entelis 35
[34]
Baldwin 141
[35]
Ottaway 12
[36]
Entelis 36
[37]
Ottaway 14
[38]
Freedom House
[39]
Morocco 2011 report = page 17
[40]
Hochman 70
[41]
Ottaway 14
[42]
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Morocco Country Report, BTI 2010, <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/146.0.html?L=1>
[43]
“Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf>
6.
[44]
Entelis 23
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