April
20, 2011
The 2011 mass uprisings have revolutionized the Arab world and have
evoked immense debate regarding the origins. The al-Jazeera chief, Wadah
Khanfar, says that the reason lies in the fact that “the modern post-colonial
Arab state has failed miserably.”[1] Some
understand this to mean that Arab nationalism has failed because these present
regimes are sometimes associated with Arab nationalist regimes like that of
Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, this paper will contest that interpretation by
saying that Khanfar was not referring to Arab nationalist states but rather
these modern post-colonial Arab states are authoritarian but not Arab
nationalist. Arab nationalism failed in the 1960s and 70s and cannot be
attributed to the present uprisings. Ultimately this paper will argue that both
Arab Nationalism and authoritarianism have failed; however, it is only the
failure of authoritarianism that has caused the current “Arab spring.” In order
to explain this argument, the essay will be structured in three parts. The
first will outline how Arab nationalism has failed; the second will explain how
the modern Arab states are authoritarian and not Arab nationalist; and the
third will discuss the failure of authoritarianism.
To begin, it is important to understand what the ideology of Arab nationalism
entails in order to recognize how it failed long before 2011. Major consensus
is found on the premise that Arab nationalism has the ultimate goal of
achieving political unity among Arab countries and the idea of a single Arab
nation.[2] For
example, Egypt’s constitution in 1956 stated that Egypt was not just an Arab
country but rather it was part of a greater Arab nation.[3] There
are some major divisions over what bonds should be focused on for the Arab
nation. Taha Husayn believed that Egypt’s bonds are not with its Arab culture
but rather with its pharaonic past and western ties.[4] He
scorns the idea of an Arab Egyptian identity and claims that Arabs are
associated more with Western thought than Far Eastern thought. Focusing on
Egypt’s Greek and pharaonic past is a tactic to convince the reader to identify
with Western culture so that it is easier to accept that “in order to become
equal partners with the Europeans, [Egyptians] must literally and forthrightly
do everything that they do.”[5] Michel
Aflaq disagrees with this conception of Arabs and instead believes that Arab
nationalism should be based on Islamic bonds because “Islam is the vital jolt
that moves the internal forces of the Arab nation.” [6] Despite
these divergent thoughts, the majority of the Arab nationalist movement did not
acknowledge religious bonds but rather leaders, such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel
Nasser advocated for secularism. Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the most
prominent Arab nationalist leaders, so although there are divergences in what
the ideology is believed to be, for the sake of simplicity this paper will base
it on Nasser’s interpretation.
Nasser’s view of the bonds that linked the Arab nation was not based on
religion (like Michel Aflaq suggested) or Egypt’s pharaonic or Western
connections (as Taha Husayn suggests), but rather he sees credit in pure
Arabism. Nasser advocated for Arab unity immensely, which can be seen in his
speeches and texts. Nasser talks about how every Egyptian before the Free
Officers coup spoke with “a confirmed individual egotism,”[7] but
that this is problematic and the “revolution makes it obligatory that
[Egyptians] unite.”[8] The
idea of revolution is another significant characteristic of Arab nationalism.
Revolution had a negative connotation among the Arab public due to what Nasser
termed was the “dismal failure” of the 1919 revolution.[9] He
emphasized that the Free Officers movement should not be seen as mutiny or
betrayal. Nasser believes that the path to progress requires Arabs to pass
through two revolutions: a political as well as a social one.[10]
Another major attribute of Arab nationalism is its focus on the need for
sovereignty and independent policy. This had an economic aspect to it as well
because Nasser calls for a move away from financial dependence and liberation
from foreign bonds.[11] The
major result of this was the attempt to regain control of their Arab resources,
such as Nasser’s move to nationalize the Suez Canal. The independence of Arab
policy also focused on the need for solidarity among Arab governments and with
the Arab cause, namely that of the Palestine question. The Arab states acted in
solidarity with the Palestinians to the extent that the conflict was often
referred to as the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than that of only the
Palestinians. These Arab leaders appealed for policy independent from the West
and for “positive neutrality;” therefore, Arab nationalism came to be
recognized as having an anti-Western characteristic.[12] For
example Nasser protested that signing onto the US-backed Baghdad Pact was a
violation of Arab nationalist interests. He wanted to remove Western influence
and focus more on Arab solidarity and cooperation. Steps towards this
cooperation are evident with the creation of the Arab League and the attempts
to unify Arab policies.[13] Despite
these serious attempts, it will now be explained how Arab nationalism
ultimately failed.
The failure of Arab nationalism can be attributed to three major causes: the
Arab Cold War rivalries, the failure of the Arab mergers, and the defeat of the
1967 Arab-Israeli war. Arab nationalism first began to take shape after the
division of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of nationalism in Turkey and other
states. Unlike these states, the Arab nation is a lot larger and is fraught
with internal divisions and inter-Arab rivalries that have hindered
pan-Arabism. Power struggles occurred because many Arab states believed that
they should be the leaders of the Arab nation. Iraq and Jordan based this on
the fact that they are descendents of the Hashemites; Syria based it on being
descendents of Faisal bin Hussein’s kingdom; and Saudi Arabia based it on its
religious status, containing the Islamic holy cities.[14] When
these rivalries were set up against the context of the international Cold War,
fragmentation increased to the extent that the period is sometimes referred to
as the Arab Cold War.[15] The
major divisions were between the progressives, which included Egypt and Syria;
against the conservatives, which included Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. The
conservative Arab states were more aligned with the United States, while the
progressives were more aligned with the Soviet Union. These power interests
made Arab unification extremely difficult.
The second major reason that Arab nationalism failed was the breakdown of attempted
unions. These mergers were cases of Arab nationalism put in practice so when
they failed, the ideology began being questioned. The first attempt at
unification was between Egypt and Syria, forming the United Arab Republic
(UAR).[16] A
problem was that it led to an opposing union being formed by Jordan and Iraq,
called the Arab Federation. Another issue was that the UAR did not last because
Syria seceded in 1961. The union was unequal and Syria was treated as a
subordinate partner in many ways. Egypt was completely dominant because Nasser
chose to not share power with the Syrian Baath party and the Syrian leader was
coerced into living in Cairo which subdued his influence.[17] Egyptian
officials also entered Syria to take positions in the country so ultimately Syria
was given a minimal role in the UAR government. Nasser’s economic, land, and
nationalization policies also served to exploit the Syrians and led to a lack
of public support for the union. As a result of Syria’s discontent, it seceded
from the union and resented the Egyptian state. Afterwards negotiations about
unification re-emerged; however, Nasser’s position was unacceptable to all
other negotiating states. He was unwilling to have a relationship based on
equality and other Arab leaders refused to sacrifice their sovereignty for Arab
nationalism.[18] Long
afterwards, Arab leaders continued to distrust unions, which prevented further
attempts at unification.
The last major factor leading to the failure of Arab nationalism was the defeat
of the Arab coalition in the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and the Arabs.
Israel was able to defeat Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which led to significant
land losses, such as that of the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Despite this
loss, Nasser’s resignation speech showed how he attempted to maintain unity
among the Arabs. He frequently repeated the word “Arab” by referring to “Arab
oil,” “Arab strength,” “Arab nation,” and “Arab homeland,” because he still
believed in Arabism as a major bond between the states. [19] He
also chose not to criticize other states after the defeat because disunity
would arise and the Arab states would blame each other. He praises the efforts
of all the states, saying that “King Husayn...adopted an excellent stand,” that
“there were other honourable and marvellous efforts,” and then he goes to list
numerous Arab states who gave strong efforts.[20] Furthermore,
Nasser tried to prevent fragmentation by allowing everyone to blame him for the
defeat. Maintaining this unity was important for the movement to continue.
Nasser still believed in his goal because he says that “this is an hour for
action; not an hour for sorrow.”[21] Despite
his desires, Arab nationalism was weakened immensely by the defeat and was
unable to recover, especially since Nasser died shortly after in 1970.
The reason that Arab nationalism was unable to be revived was because the
defeat had such a demoralizing effect on the Arab psyche that the public
themselves lost hope for the ideology. Naguib Mahfouz describes this change in
the human psyche with the transformation of the Egyptian characters in his
novel, the Karnak Cafe. The character of Hilmi Hamada was believed to represent
Arab nationalism and his death in the novel after the 1967 war symbolized the
death of the ideology. Rather than return weakened, Mahfouz chose to have
Hamada not return at all, which shows how he believes that Arab nationalism can
never be revived. The Arab defeat was so devastating that Mahfouz likened it to
the “most vicious of hammer blows smashing its way into [their] heads.”[22] Arabs
began looking towards other alternative ideologies, the most popular being
political Islam. Nasser’s predecessor also decided to change directions and
focused more on Egyptian rather than Arab interests. The idea that Sadat and
Mubarak discontinued Nasser’s policies and are not extensions of the Arab
nationalist regimes will be discussed in more detail in the next section of
this paper.
Modern Post-Colonial
Arab States: Authoritarian or Arab Nationalist?
There are many reasons why the modern post-colonial Arab states (states after
Nasser) are not considered Arab nationalist regimes. The major reason is
because these modern Arab states have stopped attempting to achieve political
unity, which is the ultimate goal of Arab nationalism. The desire for political
sovereignty is what differentiates Arab nationalists from Arabists. Instead
there has been a shift towards more decision-making based on state rather than
Arab interests. This is apparent when analyzing Sadat’s rule because he chose
to discontinue Nasser’s policies. The first example was during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war because Egypt stopped fighting the Israelis once the Sinai was
recaptured, even though Israel still occupied the Golan Heights. By doing so
Sadat abandoned other Arab leaders, such as President Assad of Syria.[23] He
also did not consult with these states when he accepted a cease-fire and a
second disengagement agreement in 1975.[24] Sadat
focused on Egyptian interests because these actions enabled them to reopen the
canal and regain their oil fields. He then unilaterally signed the Camp David
Accords, which was a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Needless to say,
Arab interests, especially those of the Palestinians were ultimately abandoned.
Mubarak’s regime has continued this direction away from Arab nationalism.
Mubarak focused on Egyptian rather than Arab interests because he chose to
uphold the Camp David Accords and did not act in solidarity with Arab states
but rather sold out to Western states. Mubarak was a major ally of the United
States and the Americans provided him with security and the bolstering of his
regime in exchange for support. These are not characteristics of Arab
nationalism; however, some may still associate these regimes with Arab
nationalism because militarized regimes have continued. Like Nasser and Sadat,
Mubarak was a military man. In addition, these rulers all had extremely
repressive and authoritarian regimes. However, these continuations are not of
Arab nationalism but rather of authoritarian, army-ruled states that are based
on repression and militarization. Wahad Khanfar seems to recognize this as well
when he describes the “modern, post-colonial Arab state.” He says that “the
security machineries in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have disintegrated in short
order, while the rest of the authoritarian and repressive regimes in the region
can see the writing on the wall.”[25] This
phrase shows that he equates these modern Arab states to authoritarian regimes,
while making no mention of Arab nationalism in the entire article. Repression
is a tactic that Nasser used during his rule but this does not mean that it is
embedded within the ideology of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism does not
have to assume the character of authoritarianism but rather it depends on its
advocates and local conditions. For example, nationalism in Turkey had a
liberating effect but in World War II, German nationalism became a destructive
force. It merely depends on how nationalism is approached. Another reason that
these modern states are mistaken for Arab nationalists is because that is what
these leaders proclaim themselves to be. An example of this is Saddam Hussein
and this case study and details of authoritarian regimes will now be explained
in the next section.
Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism is the government structure in which political power is
concentrated in a leader or a select few. Authoritarianism and army-ruled
states have been evident both during the rule of Nasser as well as afterwards.
Mahfouz illustrates how repression was evident during Nasser’s rule because
opposition was suppressed, those suspected were tortured and imprisoned, and
civil liberties were violated. Another prominent example of a repressive leader
was Saddam Hussein. In his interviews in 2004, Hussein defends his rule by
saying that he did a lot of good for his country, such as the improvement of
healthcare, the economy, education, and more.[26] However,
in reality Hussein had an extremely repressive regime that committed major war
crimes and human rights violations. Although it is undeniable that Hussein’s
regime was a case of authoritarianism, the claim that it was Arab nationalist
is a different matter. Hussein is an Arabist because he speaks out for
Palestinian Arabs and he nationalized his oil fields; however, Hussein does not
agree with Arab political unity so he cannot be considered an Arab nationalist.[27] Proof
of this is when he stated that “the question of linking unity to the
removal of boundaries is no longer acceptable to the present Arab
mentality...The Arab reality is that Arabs are now twenty-two states, and we
have to behave accordingly.”[28] In
the 1970s and 80s, Hussein began distancing himself from Arab nationalism
because it was domestically divisive.[29] Arab
nationalism did not appeal to the large minority of Kurds in Iraq as well as
the shi’ite Muslims who saw the ideology as largely led by Sunnis. Hussein
began focusing on Iraq’s Mesopotamia history so that he could diminish its Arab
identity.
Despite this rejection of Arab nationalism, Hussein and many other leaders
still claim to be Arab nationalist. Using Arab nationalist rhetoric is often
used by leaders to try to legitimize their leadership. When Hussein talks about
how Sadat was unpopular because he was not a “man of cause,” he shows how a
popular cause was important for gaining popularity among the masses and to make
them willing to endure repression. [30] Mahfouz
illustrates this when the narrator asks the question: “should we not be willing
to endure a bit of pain and inconvenience in the process of turning our
state...into a model of a scientific, socialist, and industrial nation?”[31] Hussein
also used Arab nationalism to try to justify his invasion of Kuwait during the
Persian Gulf War and to try to dissuade states from joining the anti-Iraq
resistance. Ultimately these self-proclaimed Arab nationalist/authoritarian
states have failed in the twenty-first century. Evidence of their failure
is the emergence of mass protests calling for more freedoms and democratic
reforms. The uprisings have led to the fall of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt,
and continue to threaten numerous states, such as Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc.
In conclusion, although authoritarianism and Arab nationalism have failed, it
is authoritarianism that has led to the 2011 uprisings. The failure of Arab
nationalism has largely been attributed to inter-Arab rivalries, the failure of
Arab mergers, and the Arab defeat in 1967. States following Nasser’s rule
changed directions and did not follow Arab nationalism. Some leaders were
“self-proclaimed Arab nationalists” and used their title to gain legitimacy
among their populous. As it has been discussed, authoritarianism differs from
Arab nationalism and the failure of repressive regimes has led to the “Arab
spring.” Ultimately, if these revolutions are successful democratic regimes may
emerge in the Arab world. The question that still remains unanswered is whether
Arab nationalism can be revived in these future states. The ease and rapidity
with which the Arab uprisings have jumped from one country to another are clear
indications of the interconnectedness of Arab societies. Does this mean that
the Arab psyche can recover from the failure of Arab nationalism in the 1960s?
Simply put, only time will tell.
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