November 17, 2011
United Nations
Peacekeeping has been involved in Lebanon since 1978 when the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established to respond to the Israel-Lebanon
war. There have been many different attempts to understand UN peacekeeping; in
whether or not its importance lies in the way it promotes democracy; in the way
it establishes set norms or practices; or in the way it masks state interests.
Each of these views are represented by a theory; namely, Democratic Peace
theory, Constructivism, and Realism. This paper will utilize empirical evidence
to depict how Realism performs best in explaining United Nations peacekeeping
in Lebanon. Democratic Peace theory will first be disproved with the example of
the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, which implies that although the UN works to
promote democracy, this does not always lead to peace. Constructivism will then
be disproved in the way that UN peacekeeping was ineffective in establishing
set norms/identities, (resulting in divisions among contingents), and altering
state behaviour, (resulting in continued violations). Realism is evident in UN
peacekeeping because decision-making is dominated by major powers, while states
focus on national interests. To commence, evidence against democratic peace
will first be presented.
Democratic Peace theory argues that
the role of international organizations is to promote democracy because
“established democratic states have fought no international wars with one
another,” and are less likely to because of international economic
interdependence, as well as the fact that “no democracy would pursue a minority
interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism.”[i]
Therefore, to assess whether democratic peace is statistically significant, one
would have to prove that the UN is effective in maintaining peace through its
promotion of democracy. The UN has had a history of successfully assisting
states’ transitions to democracy, even recognizing it as a human right, in that
“the will of the people as expressed through periodic and genuine elections,
shall be the basis of government authority.”[ii]
The UN has acted to monitor elections and provide technical and logistical
assistance in numerous states, such as Timor-Leste, South Africa, Mozambique, and
Afghanistan, etc.[iii] However, there is no strong relationship
between democracy and peace, and evidence of this is depicted in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon
war.
Both Israel (since 1949) and Lebanon
(since 2005) are democracies, therefore, the fact that war broke out between
them in 2006 is evidence that Democratic Peace theory is not empirically correct.[iv]
To prove this, it must be determined that the conflict was a war and that the
conflict was between Israel and the democratic Lebanese government. Although
officially Israel never declared war against Lebanon, “war in the material
sense unfolds regardless of any formal steps,” and “its occurrence is
contingent only on the eruption of hostilities between the parties.[v]
War is defined in many ways but conventionally it is recognized as “a conflict
between two sovereign members of the international system that results in at
least one thousand battle deaths.”[vi]
Thus, the fact that there were approximately a total of 1,904 casualties in the
conflict complies with this definition of war.[vii]
The Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ehud Olmert, called Hizbullah’s
kidnapping of Israeli soldiers an “act of war;” and during the conflict
Lebanon’s Ambassador to the United States said that war “was declared on us
when our country was occupied by the Israelis.”[viii]
Thus, the fact that it was a war was generally acknowledged; however, to prove
that the theory is incorrect, it now must be proven that the war was against the
democratic Lebanese government rather than the undemocratic military group,
Hizbullah.
Hizbullah initiated the war by
conducting a cross-border attack killing three and kidnapping two Israeli
soldiers, so Israel responded with major attacks on Lebanon. The direct
fighting was mainly between Israel and Hizbullah forces, and the Lebanese
government claimed that it “had no prior knowledge of the attack” and it
“disavow(s) everything that had taken place at the Lebanese-Israeli border.” [ix]
This gives the impression that the war was not with the Lebanese government; however,
this is not the case. The Israeli cabinet issued a statement saying that it
“views the sovereign Lebanese Government as responsible for the action that
originated on its soil.”[x]
The Lebanese government was largely connected to Hizbullah since it had two
ministers in the cabinet and a total of 14 seats from the Hizbullah party.[xi]
Holding states accountable for the actions of its citizens is a view that the
Bush Doctrine, namely that there is “no distinction between terrorists and the
nations that harbour them,” made conventional. Lebanese soldiers fired
anti-aircraft weapons against Israel, and approximately 43 Lebanese soldiers
were killed, thus the government played an integral role in the war.[xii]
Thus, it can finally be argued that a war was fought between two democratic
states, which proves that democratic peace is fundamentally flawed. Even if UN
peacekeeping promotes democracy, this does not guarantee that peace will be
ensured. Analyzing this theory highlights the importance of defining terms such
as war and democracy, which leads to the next theory, Constructivism.
Constructivism
This is a second possible theory to
explain UN peacekeeping. Constructivism argues that interests, identities, and
discourse are all socially constructed, “intersubjective,” and
“institutionalized.”[xiii]
The way that objects or practices are perceived can be altered; thus it is the
role of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) to try to establish a single
meaning or norm that can be adopted by other states. The IGO’s perception of a
practice or object is important because “states are concerned simultaneously
with shifting their behaviour to match the rules and reconstructing the rules
to condone their behaviour.”[xiv] In order to determine whether constructivism
explains UN peacekeeping, it must be assessed whether the UN has been
successful in altering behaviour and establishing shared norms and principles.
UNIFIL has long been using tactics
of persuasion and condemnation as a tool to coerce states into compliance.
There have been numerous resolutions passed by the UN Security Council calling
for cease-fires, condemning incursions, and urging the cessation of
hostilities.[xv]
Sometimes international pressure that arises from a UN resolution is enough to
cause a state to alter its behaviour because the passing of the resolution
means that the five major powers in the Security Council support the
declaration or at least not oppose it enough to veto it. However, it is not
always clear whether these UN actions are effective because “moral suasion is
scarcely appropriate in a community that has violated its own sense of morality.[xvi]
An example of UNIFIL’s ineffectiveness in gaining compliance is with the issue
of Hizbollah’s militarization and Israel’s frequent overflights over Lebanon.
Since 2006, Hizbullah has violated Security Council Resolution 1701, which
calls for the “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon” and Israel “for a
full cessation of hostilities...by Israel of all offensive military
operations.”[xvii]
The failure to gain compliance is due to the ineffectiveness of moral suasion
and lack of coercive measures. The fact that there has been a shift in
peacekeeping from traditional, observer mission models to more robust, heavily
armed forces, shows that the ‘naming and shaming’ technique is being replaced
by more realist tactics of force.
In theory, UNIFIL can serve as a forum
where meanings and rules can be negotiated and altered; yet the organization
has often been ineffective in trying to create a shared perspective among
states. One piece of evidence is that states were divided on how to perceive Hizbullah
as a terrorist organization or a legitimate force in the region. This was
problematic for UNIFIL because troop contingents began to implement different
policies based on their beliefs about the actor. When UNIFIL expanded in 2006,
it “came with a pronounced reluctance to even talk to Hizbullah because key UN
member states such as the US and (to a lesser degree) the Europeans look upon
Hizbullah as a terrorist organization.”[xviii]
This was an attempt by some of the states in UNIFIL to re-alter the shared perception
of Hizbullah from a legitimate to an illegitimate actor. However, UNIFIL was
ineffective in doing this because division arose among the different
contingents when some chose to by-pass the UNIFIL headquarters, and secretly
maintain communication with Hizbullah.[xix]
This was an issue because UNIFIL headquarters were no longer informed about all
communication, and “without supervision from the command level, the forces on
the ground may be tempted into local ‘deals’ with groups operating in their
area,” which would ultimately undermine the mission.[xx]
Trying to change the way of thinking about Hizbullah was ineffective because it
did not change the reality of the situation, which was that it was a dominant
force in Lebanon due to its involvement in the government and support among the
population. Although constructivism is important in explaining aspects of
international relations, the importance of power over perceptions implies that
realism plays a prominent role.
Realism
The realist argument is that
international relations is made up of a system of states competing and driven
by a need for power and survival. The role of international organizations is
minimal on influencing state behaviour (as was explained with the difficulty in
getting states to comply by moral suasion) because ultimately states are
influenced by their self-interests.[xxi]
This theory is reflected in UN peacekeeping because rather than trying to
establish international peace, states primarily use peacekeeping to promote
national self-interests.
Evidence of realism is apparent
because peacekeeping is often used to mask different political intentions.[xxii]
One reason for peacekeeping (mainly among developing countries) is the economic
motive. The UN pays each Troop Contributing Country(TCC) an amount of $1,028 US
dollars for each soldier per month.[xxiii]
Peacekeeping is also used by states to resolve conflicts that threaten to
disrupt international trade or personal economic interests. This is why TCCs
are more willing to deploy in the Middle East, because the region has major oil
resources so conflicts may disrupt trade, causing an increase in the
international price of oil. In addition, Laura Neack shows evidence that from
1982 to 1986 “many of the most frequent peace-keepers [were] also ranked among
the largest arms exporters” in the Middle East.[xxiv]
This proves the realist vision because although it may seem contradictory to
conduct both arms sales and peacekeeping, both of these actions ultimately have
the same pursuit of national interests.[xxv]
As realism argues, IGOs play a
subordinate role to states, which is evident in UN peacekeeping because IGOs
play only so much a role as states allow. The contribution of funds, troops,
and equipment are all conducted on a voluntary basis; thus the decision of
states to contribute as well as their conduct within a mission are all
influenced by state interests. States can limit what the function of their
troops will be (e.g. solely an observation role), and they can withdraw their
contributions whenever they decide to. Another example of TCCs promoting their
own interests within a peacekeeping mission is in the different ways they try
to establish the security of their contingents on the ground. One example
concerns European powers in UNIFIL because “concerned
about the high risks that their troops would face in Lebanon, these countries
–notably France- demanded more freedom of action for their soldiers and decided
to deploy heavy tanks to the area.” [xxvi]
Another example is
with Italy in Somalia, where “eyewitnesses said the Italians stood by and
refused to come to the assistance of the Nigerians during the attack” as a
result of a deal that the Italian contingent made with Somalis.[xxvii]
Realism is evident in these actions because states act in their own interests,
which undermines the effectiveness of the IGO.
Also, realism in UN peacekeeping is
evident in how financial power within the UN (indicated by how much a state
contributes to the peacekeeping budget) allows some states to have greater
power in decision-making, dictating what a peacekeeping mission should look
like and where it should be deployed. An example of this is the fact that the
US is the top financial contributor to the 2011/2012 peacekeeping budget and
although it does not provide many troops, it still dominates UN peacekeeping in
many ways.[xxviii]
Firstly, the major financial contributors could hinder a mission’s success by
threatening to withdraw economic support for a mission. In addition, the
Security Council, which is dominated by five permanent members (including the
US), is important in providing the legal basis and mandate for UN missions.[xxix]Although
peacekeeping is often described as a multinational, impartial force; the
reality of the situation is that there are major powers, such as the US, who
dominate decision-making.
In conclusion, by analyzing the
theories of Democratic Peace, Constructivism, and Realism, it is evident that
realism is the most empirically convincing theory to explain United Nations
peacekeeping in Lebanon. Democratic peace theory is empirically flawed and
mainly focuses on manipulating the terms, “war” and “democracy” in order to
serve its purpose. Constructivism is ineffective in explaining how the UN can
establish set norms and identities or lead states to alter their behaviour. Ultimately realism is
empirically sound in explaining how power politics and state interests are
embedded in UN peacekeeping. Therefore, although UN peacekeeping can be a
positive conflict-management tool, it is important to pose the question: which
TCCs are involved? To do what? And to benefit whom?
[i] John R. Oneal
and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy,
Interdependence, and International
Organizations, 1885-1992,” World
Politics 52, no. 1 (Oct 1999): 1. and Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World
Politics,” American Political Science Review 80:4 (1986); pp.1152
[ii] “Electoral Assistance,” United Nations: Department of
Political Affairs,http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/ (accessed
November 18, 2011).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] “Lebanon Country
Updates,” European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity,http://www.europeanforum.net/country/lebanon (accessed
November 18, 2011).
[v] Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence,
Third Edition, 3d ed. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), page 9.
[vi]
Oneal and Russett, 2.
[vii] “Report of the
Commission of Inquiry On Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution
S-2/1,” United Nations
General Assembly: Human Rights Council (23 Nov, 2006): 3.
[viii] “Israeli Forces
Cross Into Lebanon After Hezbollah Fight,” PBS NewsHour,http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec06/israel_07-12.html (accessed
November 18, 2011).
[ix] Ibid
[x] “Special Cabinet Communique - Hizbullah Attack,” Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Special%20Cabinet%20Communique%20-%20Hizbullah%20attack%2012-Jul-2006 (accessed
November 18, 2011).
[xii] Michael
Glennon, “The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter,” Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 25 (Spring 2002).
[xiii] Ian Hurd, International Organizations:
Politics, Law, Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 301.
[xiv] Ibid,
302
[xv] “United
Nations Documents On Unifil: Resolutions of the Security Council,” United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/resolutions.shtml (accessed
November 18, 2011).
[xvi] William
J. Durch, The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and
comparative analysis (New York: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993), page
101.
[xviii] Timur Goksel, “Unifil: Peacekeepers in the Line of
Fire,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung Middle East (August 07, 2007):
5.
[xix]
Ibid
[xx]
Ibid
[xxi] Ibid,
7
[xxii] Laura Neack,
“Un Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2
(May 1995): page 182.
[xxiii] “Financing
Peacekeeping,” United Nations Peacekeeping,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml (accessed
November 18, 2011).
[xxiv] Neack, 188.
[xxv] Ibid
[xxvi] Ronald Hatto, “Un Command and Control
Capabilities: Lessons from Unifil’s Strategic Military Cell,” International
Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (04/2009): 186-98.
[xxvii] Neack, 192.
[xxviii] Ibid
[xxix] Hisako Shimura, “The Role of the UN
Secretariat in Organizing Peacekeeping,” in Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel
(eds.) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent
Engagement (Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 2001); pp. 48.
No comments:
Post a Comment