March
8, 2011
When analyzing the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, authors such as
Melvin P. Leffler, often underestimate the importance of the Middle East to
American foreign policy. In reality, Eisenhower focused largely on this region,
saying that “no region in the world received as much of my close attention and
that of my colleagues as did the Middle East.”[1] The focus on the Middle
East became even more pronounced due to the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser and
the Arab nationalist movement. Arab nationalism was thought to be an extension
of Soviet influence; therefore, Eisenhower found it crucial to contain this
movement, which he unsuccessfully tried to do with the Baghdad pact, the OMEGA
memorandum, and most especially with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. The
doctrine was based on offering aid from U.S. military forces as a way to
“secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of
such nations, requesting such aid, against...international communism.”[2] Eisenhower targeted Arab
nationalism by trying to isolate Nasser in the Arab world, by supporting his
conservative rivals who could compete for pan-Arab leadership, and by offering
US military intervention. This paper will explain that during the Eisenhower
presidency, American foreign policy based on the Eisenhower Doctrine was
unsuccessful in trying to weaken Nasser’s Arab nationalism.
Eisenhower’s Policies
and Failures:
Eisenhower responded to the threats of Arab nationalism with different
policies. This paper will now explain what these policies were and how they
were unsuccessful in weakening Arab nationalism. In general, Eisenhower’s
objectives were to isolate Communism by isolating Nasser. The first way that
Eisenhower hoped to isolate Nasser was by sponsoring the Baghdad pact in 1955.[7] This was a regional
defence alliance that included Britain, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq. The US
wanted to build up a group in the Middle East that could counter Nasser’s Arab
nationalism and since Iraq was Egypt’s traditional rival for Arab leadership,
the Baghdad pact served to strengthen it. Although the US did not end up
joining the pact, it still played a major role in its creation by pressuring
states to join, giving military aid to Turkey and Pakistan as a condition for
their membership, by paying a part of the annual budget, and it was involved in
the pact’s military decisions by including American officers in the planning.[8] The US hoped that other
Arab states would join the group and that they could exploit the divisions
created among the Arabs. The reason that the Baghdad pact was unsuccessful was
because Arab states did not decide to join but rather it led to the formation
of other counter groups, such as the ESS pact formed by Saudi Arabia, Syria,
and Egypt, as well as the United Arab Federation with Egypt and Syria.[9] The United States decided
not to join and the pact disintegrated with Iraq leaving in 1958. Therefore,
the US was unsuccessful in trying to use the Baghdad pact as a way to isolate
Nasser and exploit the divisions between the Arab states. This same objective
was continued in the OMEGA memorandum, which will be outlined next.
Eisenhower used the OMEGA memorandum of 1956 to try to weaken Nasser’s Arab
nationalism.[10] This was a document
written up by John Foster Dulles, which suggested a focus on the isolation of
Gamal Abdel Nasser by uniting their conservative Arab allies. Eisenhower began
by restricting the 1954 Food for Peace program, delaying the process for Egypt
to purchase US grain and oil, cancelling the Aswan Dam funding, and at the same
time strengthening pro-Western Arab governments[11]. These actions were
implemented in order to coerce Nasser to change his anti-Western
policy. Eisenhower believed that “If Egypt finds herself isolated from the
rest of the Arab world... she would very quickly get sick of that prospect and
would join us in the search for a just and decent peace in that region.”[12] Soon afterwards the
OMEGA memorandum became reemphasized with the Eisenhower Doctrine.
The Eisenhower Doctrine was established from a speech that Eisenhower made in
1957 called the “Special Message to the Congress on the situation in the Middle
East.”[13] Within the speech Eisenhower
explained that they were trying to secure the region from Soviet encroachment.
There were two ways in which Eisenhower tried to create this security. Firstly,
the US was offering economic aid as well as the possibility of US military
intervention for the states that wanted to resist communism. By offering the
possibility of a US military intervention, Eisenhower hoped it would increase
the confidence of the conservative regimes and encourage more Arab states to
align with the United States. The American support also allowed leaders to
maintain control of their states because uprisings and nationalist movements
could be suppressed. The second strategy of the Doctrine was a continuation of
Eisenhower’s earlier approach, which was to isolate Nasser by bolstering
conservative Arab states and accommodating those with pro-western tendencies.
This led to a division, which George Lenczowski calls the Arab Cold War.[14] The conservative regimes
were Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and Morocco; whereas, the
more radical states were Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria. When the
doctrine was first implemented the policy was successful, however, as time went
on issues became more prevalent, leading to the failure of the Eisenhower
doctrine in containing Arab nationalism.
The first major reason why the Eisenhower Doctrine failed was because the
conservative Arab regimes that the US supported were unpopular and corrupt. The
US did not have much choice about who to support as the anti-Nasserist leader
in the Arab world. The Iraqi monarch, Nuri al-Said, was not seen as a popular
leader because of the fact that he joined the Western-sponsored Baghdad pact;
the Jordanian leader Hussein seemed like he could not maintain control in his
own country let alone have influence in other Arab states; the Lebanese president
Camille Chamoun was a Christian leader of a state that was not powerful and
divided; and Tunisia’s leader Habib Bourguiba was too far to have influence
over Arab affairs.[15] The Eisenhower Doctrine
was discredited because the US often supported these leaders who were
authoritarian, repressive and corrupt. The king of Saudi Arabia, Saud, was the
only leader that the US believed could be seen as a legitimate leader,
especially due to the religious significance of his position in the region. The
majority of the Arab population were Muslim; therefore, the US believed that
they would identify more with Saud who was known as the “Keeper of the Holy
Places of Islam,” for his role in protecting the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina, rather than Nasser who was advocating for a secular state.[16] The reason that the
population did not react as the US had predicted was because despite the title,
King Saud was known to be corrupt and a womanizer, whereas, Nasser had a
reputation of being extremely pious.[17] This policy of
supporting conservative regimes became even more difficult when the US wanted
to accommodate Nasser because Eisenhower could not do this without offending
their Arab allies.
The second major reason why the Eisenhower doctrine failed was because
America’s reputation suffered within the Arab world, which made it difficult to
get states to support the doctrine. The US was still an ally of Israel and was
complicit in its creation, they supported oppressive authoritarian states, and
the US was still allied with Britain and France who maintained a colonial
history in the region. As a result, public opinion became strongly
anti-American; whereas, Nasser was still perceived heroically in his pursuit
for pan-Arabism and due to the actions he had taken in the Suez crisis. The
Arab regimes each relied on public support in order to maintain control in the
country so they did not want to risk angering the population by supporting the
West against Nasser. Even leaders, such as King Hussein and King Saud, did not
feel comfortable endorsing the doctrine for fear of the political ramifications
of doing so.
The third major reason why the Eisenhower doctrine failed in weakening Arab
nationalism was made apparent in the Syrian crisis of 1957.[18] The case of Syria showed
that the doctrine could not prevent a radical regime from gaining control and
moving more towards cooperation with Nasser and the USSR. It had showed Eisenhower
that he could not rely on the conservative Arab regimes that he had supported
and was aligned with. He had tried to pressure Iraq and Saudi Arabia to
intervene in Syria but both were hesitant to do so for fear of public reprisal
as well as the fear that their oil pipelines in Syria would be attacked. The
safety of the oil pipelines was a considerable factor because Syria had already
attacked them in 1956 to protest against Iraq joining the Baghdad pact.[19] Allowing the oil to flow
was crucial for the economy of both these states. Due to the fact that Iraq and
Saudi Arabia were perceived as leaders, Jordan and Lebanon followed by refusing
to intervene as well. The result of the Syria-Egypt union had further
ramifications for America’s ally King Saud. He was forced to abdicate the Saudi
throne in 1958 to his brother who was pro-Nasserist. Therefore, the US was not
able to contain the spread of Nasser’s Arab nationalism in the region.
Another reason why the doctrine was unsuccessful was because even if the US was
able to help regimes consolidate power, there were often negative
ramifications, such as the suppression and alienation of the population. This
was most evident during the Lebanese Crisis, which occurred in 1958.[20] A civil war had broken
out with pro-Nasser and communist forces against the regime, which led Chamoun
to ask for US military intervention to help him maintain control.[21] This incident
discredited the Eisenhower doctrine because it alienated much of the Lebanese
and Arab population. The US had intervened on behalf of Chamoun even though he
was unpopular and was seeking to change the constitution to allow him another
term in power. This created anti-American sentiment because the US had
facilitated a leader that was undemocratic and suppressed his population. The
doctrine also put Eisenhower in a difficult situation because Chamoun had
aligned with the West and supported the doctrine; therefore, it was important
to show other Arab leaders that the US would stick with their allies.[22] Knowing that the US
would intervene, Chamoun was more inclined to take steps that he knew would
aggravate the situation. Therefore, the doctrine had negative consequences by
encouraging leaders to take unpopular and uncompromising positions regardless
of public opinion.
The last reason why Eisenhower was unsuccessful in dealing with Arab
Nationalism was because the strategy to counter Nasser was problematic as
opposed to cooperating with him. What Malcolm Kerr suggests is that there needs
to be a “coming to terms with Nasser.”[23] Kerr attributes
Eisenhower’s difficulties in the Middle East to the fact that the
administration was not able to understand Nasser and the importance of his
movement to the Arab population. Nasser was not being taken seriously and in
many ways Arab nationalism was misunderstood by the Eisenhower administration.
One of the major points of misunderstanding was the relationship between Arab
nationalism and communism. The main animosity Eisenhower felt towards Nasser
was due to his support for communism; however, this was not exactly accurate
because communism was not always welcomed in Egypt. Nasser imprisoned
communists within Egypt and tensions existed with the Soviets because of their
interference in the domestic affairs of Arab states.[24] The perception that
Nasser supported communism was attributed to his adoption of “positive
neutralism.”[25] Positive neutralism
meant that Nasser would look to both Cold War blocs in order to pursue his
interests. What this suggests is that Arab nationalism was not a threat unless
the United States rejected Nasser, which consequently led him to seek a relationship
from the Soviets. This rejection was evident when the United States refused to
fund the Aswan Dam project and when they refused to give military aid to Egypt.
Therefore, Eisenhower’s approach was unsuccessful and he could have approached
Nasser differently. Rather than countering Nasser, Eisenhower could have tried
to understand him, accommodate him, and accept the importance of the movement
among the Arab population.
Looking at the events following Eisenhower’s presidency can also expose evidence
of the failure of the doctrine. Firstly, at the end of his presidency,
Eisenhower formally discarded the doctrine and began focusing more on
accommodating Nasser, which was a policy that John F.Kennedy adopted as well.
Arab nationalism was not contained but rather it continued to influence the
region until a decade later. The decline of Arab nationalism was not attributed
to the Eisenhower administration but rather the internecine disputes following
the Arab defeat in the 1967 Yom Kippur war as well as the enactment of the Camp
David Accords in 1978.[26]
In conclusion, it is evident that during the Eisenhower presidency, American
foreign policy based on the Eisenhower Doctrine was unsuccessful in trying to
weaken Nasser’s Arab nationalism. Eisenhower perceived Arab nationalism to be a
threat; therefore, he tried to implement the Baghdad pact, the OMEGA
memorandum, as well as the Eisenhower Doctrine as a way to contain the
movement. Each of these policies followed the same strategies and objectives of
isolating Nasser and bolstering other counter-Nasser Arab states. Eisenhower’s
policies proved to be ineffective because it alienated the Arab population, the
rival Arab conservative states were unreliable, and America’s reputation in the
Arab world made alliances difficult to maintain. Therefore, it is clear that
analyzing Eisenhower’s Cold War policy is not complete until its role in the
Middle East and its effect on Arab nationalism is included.
[1] George Lenczowski, American
Presidents and the Middle East (London: Duke University Press, 1990),
46.
[2] Dwight David Eisenhower,
“Eisenhower Doctrine Transcript,” Miller Center of Public Affairs,
1957, available from <http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3360>
accessed March 5, 2011.
[3] William Cleveland, The
Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought
of Sati-al-Husri (New Jersey: Princton University Press, 1971), 90.
[4] Gamal Abd al-Nasser,
Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington DC: Public
Affairs Press, 1955), 82.
[5] Melvyn P. Leffler, For
the Soul of Manking: The United States, The Soviet Union and the Cold War,
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 129.
[6] Salim Yaqub, Containing
Arab Nationalism: Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (London: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 3.
[7] Peter L. Hahn, Crisis
and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington:
Potomac Books, 2005), 16
[8] Ibid 16,17
[9] Yaqub 38
[10] Warner Geoffrey, “The
United States and the Suez Crisis,” Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 307 (1991) 303-317.
[11] Yaqub 43
[12] Yaqub 42
[13] Eisenhower
[14] Lenczowski 72
[15] Yaqub 103
[16] Yaqub 44
[17] Yaqub 16
[18] Douglas Little, “Cold
War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria 1945-1948,” Middle
East Journal, 69 (1990) 51-75.
[19] Hahn 43
[20] Tarun Chandra
Bose, Superpowers and the Middle East, (New York: Asia Publishing
House, 1972), 52.
[21] Ibid
[22] Yaqub 236
[23] Malcolm Kerr, “Coming to
Terms with Nasser: Attempts and Failures,” Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 65 (1967) 65-84.
[24] Yaqub 8
[25] Yaqub 5
[26] Bose 114
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