December
3, 2010
“Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred
battles you will never be in peril” ~Sun Tzu[1]
George Bush in his address to Congress on September
20, 2001 stated that al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11 were motivated by the fact that
“they hate our freedoms”[2].
However, by reading Lawrence Wright’s book, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda
and the Road to 9/11, it is evident that the people involved and their
motivations are much more complex than Bush expressed. Although it may be
comforting to think that the motivations were based solely on resentment and
jealousy, there are many possible motivations for the 9/11 attacks, such as
sociological factors, economic factors, mental illness, ideological motivations
and what Wright focuses on: human agency. Wright is successful in explaining how terrorism is
largely motivated by human agency and how this has serious implications for developing an effective counter-terrorism
strategy. This paper will focus on the diversity of terrorists, their
grievances, their development, and the strategic function behind terrorism.
To commence, it is important to briefly explain the basis of
Wright’s book and arguments. The book provides background on the development of
al Qaeda up to the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001.
Wright focuses on three individuals who were central to the founding of al
Qaeda: Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Sayyid Qut’b; as well as one
American FBI agent named John O’Neill who was a key investigator in trying to
prevent the terrorist attacks. Wright’s basic purpose of the book is to explain
the background of these individuals and what their motivations were for
attacking the United States. He does this through a narrative format and by
illustrating the positive and negative characteristics of each character done
through the inclusion of anecdotes.
The author has accomplished his goal of bringing insight into the minds
of the al Qaeda leadership and there are numerous ways as to how he does this,
why this is important and what the implications are for counter-terrorism
strategies.
Diversity in
Terrorism:
Firstly, Wright illustrates how terrorists are complex and diverse. He
describes the positive attributes of the al Qaeda members in order to humanize
the individuals and make them more into complex beings. He explains that “things are dangerous when they become simple, when it’s
good-and-evil and us-versus-them and the West versus Islam[3]”.
Showing the complexities of al Qaeda becomes necessary to battle these
paradigms and to show that there is a danger in over generalizing and that no
one should be categorized as the “other”. Wright shows extensively “how fissured and split the jihadist
movement has been historically” over divergence in personnel, strategy, and
ideological beliefs[4].
Diversity is shown first with what each wanted to achieve because Zawahiri
wanted to make Egypt an Islamic state, while Bin Laden wanted to have a
universal restoration of Islam. Diversity is also evident in the many
interpretations of Islam, the different dialects that were spoken, and the
different locations that the individuals were from. The book challenges
polarization by not only showing the differences between people but the
similarities between the Arabs and Americans as well. He juxtaposes O’Neill
with Bin Laden to show that they are more similar than people may think. Wright
relates O’Neill’s natural promiscuity to Bin Laden’s practice of polygamy and
O’Neill’s extremism in Catholicism to Bin Laden’s Islamic extremism.
These findings explain that a counter terrorism strategy should
acknowledge that terrorists are diverse and are motivated by different things.
Terrorism should be treated as specific cases, rather than viewing it as a
representation of a religion or race. This is an important differentiation to
make in a time when some people mistake Islam for terrorism. Dehumanizing al
Qaeda allows governments to use aggressive military actions or commit human
rights abuses, while justifying it as an appropriate and proportional counter
terrorism response. This response can have long term impacts because
individuals may become radicalized if they feel resentment over the injustices.
This is supported by the fact that al Qaeda has maintained its strength and
that terrorism is more prevalent than ever, according to the Oxford Research
Group[5].
It is evident that warfare is a problematic counter terrorism response to al
Qaeda because terrorists are located everywhere around the world so targeting a
single country may not have a significant effect. Therefore, it is crucial to
acknowledge diversity in an effective counter terrorism strategy.
Legitimacy in Terrorism:
The second argument that Wright shows is that the
motivations behind terrorism may be based on legitimate grievances. He does
this by refraining from demonizing al Qaeda because if this happens then the
individuals will be merely disregarded as deviants and villains, rather than
analyzed objectively. As a result, there is less chance of discovering their
motivations, especially motives that are based on legitimate grievances. The
fact that Osama Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and Sayyid Qut’b began by respecting
America shows that their choice to reposition their views is worthy of
analysis. Osama Bin Laden resented the fact that America supported Israel in
Palestine and had troops in Saudi Arabia as well as Lebanon. They felt
humiliated and perceived that “the United States was responsible for the
humiliating failure of the Arabs to succeed”[6].
In addition, America’s support of oppressive regimes in the Arab-Islamic world
resulted in terrorism being “a reaction to the injustice in the region’s
domestic politics, inflicted in large part by the U.S.”[7].
Zawahiri and Qut’b are both from Egypt and Bin Laden is from Saudi Arabia,
which are two countries that have atrocious human rights records, yet are
strongly supported by America.
A counter terrorism strategy must acknowledge the
motivations behind terrorism because as Noam Chomsky states, “those who want victory against terror
without addressing underlying grievances want an unending war”[8]. He suggests that it is necessary to adhere to “elementary moral
standards” when determining a counter terrorism strategy or response. Many
terrorists just want to get media attention on a political issue so by allowing
them the avenue to be heard can be a way of preventing future violence.
Although not always the case, usually by identifying and dealing with these
grievances one can counter terrorism in the future.
Existential Crisis in Terrorism:
The third aspect of terrorism that Wright
illustrates is the idea that terrorists undergo a personal journey, or face
what Mazarr calls an “existential crisis”, leading to their radicalization. He
stresses that the origins of terrorism are largely psychological and the result
of individuals going through a process of self-actualization in the midst of
pressures from modernity, globalization, identity, and alienation.
Existentialists often reject the status quo and the moral system that is in
place. Wright seems to support this idea by showing the development of the al
Qaeda leadership and how they faced triggers in their life, which led to their
ultimate choices. Although many factors were influential, Sayyid Qut’b and
Zawahiri’s triggers were said to be when they were in prison and Bin Laden’s
was when his Saudi citizenship was revoked and his family rejected him.
This has significant implications for developing a
counter terrorism strategy because as Mazarr argues, there is a need to analyze
whether “phenomenon that are fundamentally psychological in character can be
defeated with military power or law enforcement efforts”[9].
He believes that extremist Islam cannot be countered through military means.
Wright appears to support this because he shows how extremism can be countered
through good interrogators, who use knowledge rather than inhumane torture
techniques to attain information. The illustration of Soufan serves this
purpose because he was able to convince Abu Jandal to reveal information by
being respectful and engaging him in theological debate. He was able to address
Jandal’s misconceptions about the United States and was important because of what
he represented as “a Muslim who could argue religion with him, who was in the
FBI, [and] who loved America”[10].
This is crucial to understand because if motivations are purely psychological
then the “war on terrorism” is futile and instead there should be a focus on
targeting the mindset of individuals. Mazarr says that “the roots of such
beliefs lie in national, historical, social, and economic places, and only by
attending to these other factors can we keep our necessary military responses
from becoming counterproductive”[11].
Once terrorists are understood more clearly, then it may be easier to
anticipate their actions.
Rationality in Terrorism:
Wright also focuses on the theme of terrorism as being rational and
strategic. He explains how Osama Bin Laden believed that the Arab resistance in
Afghanistan was solely responsible for removing the Soviet Union from the
territory. Therefore, Al Qaeda’s 2001 attack on the United States could have
been following the same strategy to try to pressure America into removing its
troops from Saudi Arabia. As Wright explains, Bin Laden believes that “the
Americans did not get out of Vietnam until after they suffered great losses;”
therefore, “the Americans won’t stop their support of Jews in Palestine until
we give them a lot of blows”[12].
Using terrorism as a tactic has often been successful throughout history.
Robert Pape states that “terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically
designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial
concessions” or at least to achieve a political objective[13].
He criticizes the pattern of states in giving concessions to suicide terrorist
organizations and suggests that an effective counter-terrorism strategy must
recognize this rationality. In addition, states should pursue policies that
have more to do with improving homeland security than with concessions or
offensive military action[14].
Specifically to deal with al Qaeda, the U.S. should implement stricter border
patrols and try to become energy independent in order to reduce oil dependence.
It is evident that there is a close association between foreign military
occupations and terrorism; therefore, the U.S. must try vehemently to reduce
the need to put troops in the region to protect their oil interests.
In order to determine whether Wright’s arguments about human agency are
correct, certain critiques need to be addressed. The first issue that is
evident is that Wright focuses on the background and motivations behind the
leadership of al Qaeda, yet he does not examine the motivations for lower
status terrorists, such as the 9/11 hijackers. Wright’s conclusions about
motivations may be different if he examined the others because socio-economic
factors could be more of a factor and motivations behind suicide terrorism
could be different. For example, although many of the leaders came from middle
or upper class families, Osama Bin Laden paid the salaries of the other
terrorists; therefore, the monetary incentive may have been the primary
motivation for one of the individuals that he employed. Another critique is
that by humanizing the terrorists that is said to be a way of legitimizing
their actions. The last critique that will be analyzed is how Wright included
the issue of the bureaucratic failure in the intelligence agency. The argument
is that Wright contradicts himself by focusing on structural failures, rather
than attributing the failure to human agency and individual mistakes.
To counter the first argument, it is evident that Wright chose to focus
on the leadership for a specific reason. Without Zawahiri, Bin Laden, and
Qut’b, al Qaeda would not exist so it is a strategy. Bin Laden serves as the
financier, Qut’b is the inspiration, and Zawahiri is the brains of al Qaeda.
Furthermore, they are responsible for recruiting thousands of other individuals
so it is only natural to try to focus on preventing other individuals with
influence as they have from playing a similar role. Also, it can be seen that
motivations for suicide terrorism is not much different. Those that use this
tactic are still diverse and “can be college educated or uneducated, married or
single, men or women, socially isolated or integrated, from age 13 to 47”[15].
As Pape argues, suicide terrorists are still motivated by the same factor,
which is human agency because it is a strategy to achieve their political aim.
It is important to remember the theme of diversity once again because it is not
to say that some individuals are not motivated more by economics or religion,
but that these are stereotypes that need to be challenged and that many
individuals do not fit into this paradigm. Zawahiri’s mujahideen recruits were
said to be doctors, engineers, and soldiers; therefore, they obviously do not
fit into the stereotype of being poor, alienated and unemployed. Alan B.
Kreuger and Jitka Maleckova support this argument that economic incentives are
not the primary motivation. They argue that “any connection between poverty,
education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak” and
that motivations are more a result of humiliation and resentment[16].
A lack of education is also not a factor leading to terrorism but rather it is
argued that those with better education are even more likely to join terrorist
organizations if they think that they will be given leadership positions as a
result[17].
Organizations prefer recruits that are better educated so this is often the
case. Wright also shows that religion is not a factor by illustrating how al
Qaeda appeared to be motivated by Islamic fundamentalism; however, there were
numerous inconsistencies with the their adherence to the teachings and how
religion was used solely as a way to try to legitimize their missions. An
example of an inconsistency was how suicide is immoral in Islam, yet al Qaeda
was able to manipulate the tactic by differentiating between suicide and
martyrdom. Therefore, Wright focused on the leadership of al Qaeda because he
believed that the organization would not exist otherwise and because human
agency was shown to be a more prevalent factor than economic or religious
motivations.
The second counter-argument is to deal with the perception that
humanizing the individuals is a way to legitimize their actions. This argument
is not an “exercise of what the French term, ‘tout
comprendre, c’est tout pardoner’ (To understand everything is to forgive
everything)” but instead it allows individuals a more objective analysis of the
individuals involved[18].
Understanding al Qaeda more clearly means that there can be more of an attempt
to anticipate their actions in the future.
The last argument to analyze is the idea that
focusing on the structural failures of the FBI and CIA is a contradiction of
Wright’s theme of human agency. This is not the case because he analyzes
specific individuals involved in much the same way that he does with the al
Qaeda leadership. Wright even states that “the response of American
intelligence to the challenge presented by al-Qaeda was hampered by the dismal
personal relationships and institutional warfare that these men exemplified”[19].
He acknowledges how intelligence groups are ultimately groups of individual
people with different interests, different tactics, and influenced by power
struggles.
In conclusion, in Lawrence Wright’s book, The
Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, he is successful in showing
how human agency is primary motivation for terrorism and how this has an impact
on developing a counter terrorism strategy. Understanding how and why people
become terrorists is essential in order to anticipate their behavior and
prevent it in the future. Until the aspects of diversity, legitimacy,
psychology, and rationality are considered, an effective strategy will not take
shape and terrorism will become an eternal phenomenon.
[1] Randy Borum, “Understanding the
Terrorist Mind-Set,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin: Criminal Justice
Periodicals, 2003
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=randy_borum>
7.
[2] “Transcript of President Bush’s
address,” Cable Network News, 21 Sep. 2001 <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>
[3] Harry Kreisler, “Lawrence Wright
Interview: Conversations with History,” Institute of International
Studies, 2007 <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people6/Wright/wright-con6.html>
[4] Peter L. Bergen, The
Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda’s Leader. (New York:
Free Press, 2006) xxxiv
[5] Paul Rogers, “Endless War: The
Global War on Terror and the New Bush Administration,” Oxford Research
Group, 2005 <http://www.stwr.org/global-conflicts-militarization/endless-war-the-global-war-on-terror-and-the-new-bush-administration.html>
[6] Lawrence Wright, The
Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, (New York: Vintage Books,
2007) 171
[7] Noam Chomsky, “Wars of Terror,” New
Political Science, Vol.25 No.1, <http://content.wuala.com/contents/nappan/Documents/chomsky,%20noam%20-%20wars%20of%20terror,%20new%20political%20science.pdf>
10
[9] Michael J. Mazarr, “The
Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism: Alienation and Identity in the Arab
World”, Policy Review, June/July 2004, Vol. 125.
[13] Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic
Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review,
August 2003 <http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/guest/Pape1.pdf>
344
[16] Alan B. Kreuger and Jitka
Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal
Connection?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives: American Economic
Association. Fall 2003, Vol. 17, No.4.
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