November 14, 2011
When
analyzing United Nations peacekeeping, a trend is evident where traditional
peacekeeping missions are being more often replaced by missions that are more
robust, complex, and multidimensional. The question that this essay will ask is
whether or not the observer mission model is still an effective strategy, by
examining the case study of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO). There are those, such as Brian Urquhart, who would describe UNTSO as
“pitifully inadequate;” however, this paper will argue that although UNTSO has
had many shortcomings, UNTSO’s use of the observer method is an important and
effective approach to peacekeeping and it has played a significant role in
stabilizing the region.[i]
UNTSO was the first established peacekeeping operation and is successful in
many ways. It deals with the Arab-Israeli crisis as a regional issue by
deploying in five states, it is funded from the United Nations(UN) regular
budget as opposed to the peacekeeping budget, its mandate does not need to be
renewed, and ultimately, “by virtue of their presence, observers alter what
they are observing” and serve as a deterrence.[ii]
This is not to say that major problems do not exist within the organization but
rather this paper will provide recommendations of different policies and
changes that UNTSO should implement if it is to continue to be a successful
organization. Before UNTSO is assessed, it is important to recognize the
evolution and history of the organization and how it has adapted to different
political conditions to become what it is today.
The origins and development of UNTSO
has been largely shaped by the history of major wars in the Middle East, namely
in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Following each of these wars, the function and
sometimes mandate of UNTSO have changed.[iii]
The origins of the conflict began in 1947 when Britain decided to consult the
UN on how to resolve the question of its Palestinian mandate, where they
supported a Jewish nation but faced Arab resistance. The UN created the UN
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to analyze the situation and compile a
report, which called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab
state, and was endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 181.[iv]
The partition led to Arab resistance and the outbreak of war on May 14, 1948.[v]
The UN tried to establish a peace agreement by appointing a mediator and
creating a Truce Commission for Palestine, to no avail. Therefore, the mediator
requested additional aid, and on May 29th, 1948, the UN Truce
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by Security Council resolution
50, in order to help supervise the one-month truce and “bring about the
cessation of hostilities in Palestine.”[vi]
Although it was deployed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, Article 11 of the
resolution threatened to invoke Chapter VII if the resolution was rejected or
truce breached by any party. UNTSO originally consisted of 50 military
observers who arrived to monitor the first truce in June 1948. However, when
the fighting escalated, the observers withdrew in July 9, 1948 but were
re-established with a second truce on the 15th and an expanded UNTSO
military observer force.[vii]
After August 1949, the functions of
UNTSO changed with Security Council resolution 73, due to the establishment of
four General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) between Israel and Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria.[viii]
The mediator and Truce Commission were dissolved and instead four Mixed
Armistice Commissions (MACs) were formed as a tool of UNTSO to manage the
agreements.[ix]
Thus, UNTSO had two functions: “first to observe and report on the truce which
was established on June 18, 1948, and secondly, to maintain the organization of
the Mixed Armistice Commissions.”[x]
The MACs consisted of an equal number of personnel representing each state as
well as a chairman from UNTSO to mediate. Complaints of agreement violations
were investigated by the MACs, where UNTSO observers would share their evidence
and the MACs would make a decision with the UNTSO chairman typically casting
the deciding vote. Other functions of UNTSO
included “demarcating armistice lines, mediating differences between the
parties, establishing demilitarized zones, deterring an arms build-up,
facilitating the exchange of prisoners,” and making reports to the UN Security
Council.[xi]
UNTSO faced limitations to its role
after 1951 because participating states refused to attend regular sessions of
the MACs so the UNTSO chair had to conduct negotiations separately with each
state, thus becoming more of “an envoy [or] a bearer of ‘disguised ultimatums’
instead of a mediator.”[xii]
Furthermore, Israel withdrew from three MACs (Syria in 1951, Jordan in 1954,
and Egypt in 1955), which further restricted UNTSO’s role and effectiveness in
monitoring the armistice agreements.
Another moment of change for UNTSO
was after the 1956 Suez war when a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was
deployed to Egypt. At this time UNTSO played a major role in providing
expertise and deployed a group of trained military personnel. This was a defining
moment for UNTSO because it was the first time that its expertise was used to
establish a UN mission, which became a precedent for missions that followed.[xiii]
UNTSO’s role in Egypt declined because the Egypt-Israeli MAC continued to be
inactive and a shift occurred with UNEF taking control of organizing agreements
rather than UNTSO. Since the abrogation of the MACs occurred unilaterally by
Israel, UNTSO continued the meetings of the MACs without Israel in order to
“symbolize the UN’s contention that the Armistice agreements remained legally
in force.”[xiv]
UNTSO still maintained the consent of Egypt so during the war they continued to
patrol on the Egyptian side of the border in conjunction with UNEF, while
investigating complaints.[xv]
The next phase of UNTSO was
characterized by the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. This led to the original mandate
becoming difficult to implement because new cease-fire lines were established
between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.[xvi]
UNTSO no longer had the MAC system because Israel withdrew from the initial
armistice agreements, but instead UNTSO’s role was to help establish and
supervise the new cease-fire lines. For this purpose, UNTSO set up observation
posts in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.
The final phase that UNTSO went
through was following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 to the present. There were
minor changes to the location of observer posts but there was also a new
“Observer group” concept put into place, which reorganized UNTSO in order to
focus on different regions. This formed the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL),
Observer Group Egypt (OGE), and Observer Group Golan (OGG).[xvii]
The groups were multinational in order to ensure impartiality because any
observation will have to be documented by at least two observers from different
states. These groups also played a large role in facilitating the creation of three
UN peacekeeping missions in the region, and provided them with military
observers; namely, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in 1973, the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974, and the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978. Two states reached permanent peace
agreements with Israel. Egypt established a peace treaty in 1979, yet an UNTSO
presence was still requested by the Egyptian government. Jordan reached its
peace agreement in 1994 but neither Israel nor Jordan requested that UNTSO
remain.
Today, UNTSO’s tasks vary
tremendously between the three observer groups in Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, because
each agreement has specific rules that UNTSO must supervise. For example, UNTSO’s
tasks within the OGG focuses on maintaining the Disengagement Agreement, which calls
for rules like limited troop levels and military equipment in the region
between Israel and Syria, called the Area of Separation (AOS). In this case,
UNTSO’s tasks are centered on carrying out fortnightly inspections to ensure
that the conditions are met in the AOS. The observer groups continue to play a
role in aiding other peacekeeping missions in the region, by supervising
agreements, creating demilitarized zones, investigating incidents, and
reporting violations to the United Nations Security Council.[xviii]
UNTSO’s mandate continues to follow the original resolution, which is for “the
supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those agreements,
with particular regard to the desires of the parties as expressed in the
relevant articles of the agreements.”[xix]
Although the political context of the conflict led to changes in UNTSO’s
mandate and functions; it is also important to note how it affected the
structure of the organization.
The structure and composition of
UNTSO has also evolved, especially due to Cold War politics. UNTSO began mainly
as a Western force with American, Belgian, and French observers. It was not
until 1955 that the Soviet Union announced support for UNTSO as a way to prevent
the US from continuing their monopoly over UN peacekeeping. In order to
maintain a balance between the USSR and the US, an equal number of observers
(36 each) were provided to UNTSO.[xx]
To prevent the conflict from escalating to a world war, the major powers began
decreasing their contributions, and the composition of the force began to
involve more middle powers, although it was still dominated by western nations.[xxi]
Today UNTSO is composed of 150 military observers from 34 different states, 96
international civilian personnel, and 135 local civilian staff.[xxii]
The structure is still highly decentralized because some observer groups are
assigned to either UNIFIL or UNDOF and are under the operational control of
their Force Commander. However, these UNTSO observers are still under the
command of the UNTSO Chief-of-Staff, who is currently Major General Juha Kilpia
from Finland.[xxiii]
Although it is necessary to examine the historical background of UNTSO, it is
also important to assess the effectiveness of the organization.
Successes and Shortcomings:
Despite the many problems with
UNTSO, it continues to play a significant role in the region and has had many
successes to note. Firstly, UNTSO’s
mission is very cost-effective and unlike other missions it is paid for by the
UN’s regular budget as opposed to the peacekeeping budget. This ensures that
UNTSO is less dependent on voluntary contributions by Troop Contributing Countries
(TCCs) so that states cannot threaten to withdraw funds if they lose support
for UNTSO.[xxiv]
Also, the fact that UNTSO personnel cannot use force means that it is more likely
to be supported by host states, easier to maintain consent, and easier to
maintain legitimacy internationally. In addition, UNTSO uses multinational
observer groups and reports through channels independent from other
peacekeeping missions, so it is perceived as impartial and offers an
alternative view of border issues.[xxv]
When the former Chief-of-Staff, Odd Bull, was asked why UNTSO is useful, he
said “that UN observers are the only people who can report objectively.”[xxvi]
This is an important feature of UNTSO because observing the reality on the
ground is important so that when it is reported to the UN Security Council; states
can make informed decisions based on the facts of the situation. Thus, UNTSO
acts as a link between the UN Security Council and UN on the ground so that
when violations are reported, the Security Council can make resolutions
condemning the state and this international pressure can act to deter states
from committing further violations. In addition, SC resolution 50 threatens to
arm UNTSO with the use of force if there is non-compliance because this would “demonstrate
the existence of a breach of the peace... requiring immediate consideration by
the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of
the Charter.”[xxvii]
Another success of UNTSO is the fact
that its mandate is broad and flexible. The broad nature of the mandate enables
UNTSO to adapt to different situations by relocating its posts or by increasing
the number of observers. Other missions, such as UNDOF and UNIFIL are static
and they focus on a single region; however, UNTSO’s mandate allows it to
maintain a presence in Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt.[xxviii]
For example, UNIFIL can only be
stationed in southern Lebanon but UNTSO can travel all around the country and
within Israeli territory. This is true of UNDOF as well because it is not able
to patrol on the Israeli side of the border but UNTSO is allowed to do so.
Ultimately, UNTSO has less travel restrictions, which is beneficial because if
a conflict arises in the region, UNTSO troops can be deployed quickly rather
than having to wait for a UNSC resolution to issue a new mission. This has been
a unique characteristic of UNTSO because it is “the only permanent,
professional UN peacekeeping force ready to move at a moment’s notice,” and is
sometimes referred to as a possible “rapid reaction force”[xxix]
UNTSO has had some success in undertaking tasks, logistical support, and
ultimately coordinating with UNDOF and UNIFIL so that the missions are
implemented smoothly. Also, UNTSO is different to other peacekeeping missions
because its mandate does not need to be renewed every six months. When it was
established, UNTSO was supposed to monitor compliance until peace was obtained
in the region, thus it is a stable actor in the region.
Despite the many successes of UNTSO,
there have been major issues and shortcomings that have inhibited it from being
a more effective force. One of these shortcomings is the perceived lack of
imbalance among the TCCs. When it was created, UNTSO was seen as biased in
favour of the US due to the fact that the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie,
regularly condemned the Communists as a way to ensure US support for UNTSO.[xxx]
From its onset, the western composition of UNTSO led states to suspect that the
UK and US were using UNTSO as a way to obtain a trusteeship in Palestine.[xxxi]
Since UNTSO was viewed as “an extension of Western Cold War policy,” it lacked
legitimacy and was not perceived as an impartial force.[xxxii]
UNTSO functioned as a force to provide information and legitimacy to the U.S.
so that it could determine the best way to approach the region without
interference from the Soviets.[xxxiii]
As a result, a lack of local support was evident, which was reflected in what
Van Horn explains as the constant obstruction of UN observers’ freedom of
movement and harassment.[xxxiv]
A major imbalance continues to be evident, since there are no TCCs from Muslim
or Arab states, the majority of TCCs are western nations, and out of 34
commanders only four have been non-western, namely, Nigeria, Nepal, and two
Ghanaian commanders.[xxxv]
Issues of impartiality still arise, and can be seen in an incident as recent as
July 2011, when UNTSO was accused of leaking information to Israel. When the UN
International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) finished its
investigation of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, UNTSO was responsible for
transporting the equipment and resources from the offices in Lebanon to the
Netherlands.[xxxvi]
Sayyid Nasrallah criticized UNTSO because 97 computers were not taken out
through Beiruit International Airport but rather through Israel, leading to
accusations of Israeli bias.[xxxvii]
Another major problem with UNTSO is
its difficulty in enforcing agreements. The mission is deployed under Chapter
VI of the charter so deployment requires the consent of the parties involved
and does not allow the use of force. Having to maintain consent and support of
the states becomes problematic because it puts UNTSO in a powerless position
and in some cases, the chief-of-staff has been replaced because of a lack of
support from the participating states. For example, in 1953 the Danish
Major-General Vagn Bennike, implemented policies that Israel did not support so
the state worked to undermine him and he was eventually replaced after only 14
months.[xxxviii]
Another example was Colonel Mick Johnson who was declared “persona non grata”
by Israel and replaced because he “caught the Israelis in some unspecific
improprieties” during the six-day war.[xxxix]
Since observers are unarmed and cannot coerce states into adhering to the
rules, the leaders are dependent on having support from the governments
involved, which created instability in UNTSO’s leadership.
UNTSO also lacked resources to deal
with the large scale of the conflict. For example, when the Syria-Israel MAC
was in session, Syria had lodged 30,600 complaints against Israel and Israel
lodged 35,485 complaints against Syria, so UNTSO did not have the resources to
deal with the large scale of violations[xl]
In addition, UNTSO sometimes could not use some of their resources. For
example, UNTSO was denied access to helicopters and boats by both Egypt and
Israel because of fear of espionage since the helicopters could be used to
observe each state’s military positions.[xli]
Another resource that UNTSO has been unable to utilize has been American
personnel due to the security risk. After the 1988 killing of American UNTSO
Chief Military Observer, Richard Higgins, the US Secretary of Defence, Frank Carlucci
established that no US personnel be allowed in Lebanon.[xlii]
UNTSO’s Chief Plans Officer in Jerusalem has been an American since 1999;
however, American personnel are subject to travel restrictions due to the
safety risk, thus, they are not able to be used effectively.[xliii]
The security risks are a major challenge to UNTSO because fifty personnel have
been killed and sometimes these losses causes states (such was the case of
Austria) to request the withdrawal of their troops.[xliv]
In addition, observers are unable to conduct their jobs effectively in insecure
situations because when there is firing they are required to go into their
shelters rather than their platforms.[xlv]
The resource that UNTSO relies on is “moral suasion [and this] is scarcely
appropriate in a community that has violated its own sense of morality.”[xlvi]
Although there have been numerous violations, these states have not faced major
consequences and as a result violations continue.
Another problem with UNTSO is the
decentralized structure of the mission. When the MACs were in place, there was
a lack of harmony between these commissions in the different states and this
lack of coordination continues to be seen among the observer groups.[xlvii]
The fact that UNTSO is spread out over multiple states and has certain groups
under the operational command of other missions, makes it difficult to maintain
a coherent stance. Ultimately, UNTSO has been ineffective in maintaining the
peace and permanent agreements have not been reached with all the states.
Policy Recommendations:
In order to manage the shortcomings
of UNTSO, this essay will present various policy recommendations to alter the
scale and functions of the mission. The first policy recommendation is that
more observers need to be deployed. It is evident that 150 observers are not
enough to monitor the four states it is required to. The increase in personnel
also has to make an attempt to include more Arab or Muslim TCCs in order for it
to be a more balanced and representative force. The composition of the mission
is important because the majority of western states need to be balanced out so
that it maintains the image of an impartial and legitimate force.
The next recommendation is that the
location in which UNTSO is deployed in must be reorganized. The problem of
decentralization in UNTSO means that there are major problems of coordination
between the different observer groups because OGL and OGG are under the
operational control of other peacekeeping missions, yet they still receive
their logistics from UNTSO’s headquarters in Jerusalem. As a result, these
groups often receive old equipment and have more limitations, which make it
hard for them to match the operational tempo of the other organizations.[xlviii]
Therefore, it is not as necessary for UNTSO to be deployed in these same
regions where UNIFIL and UNDOF can use their own observers and would be more
capable of dealing with the situation. Instead UNTSO should take advantage of
the fact that its mandate gives them more freedom to deploy in other parts of
the region where UNIFIL and UNDOF are limited. One of the locations that UNTSO
should be deployed in is the border between Lebanon and Syria. It has long been
suspected that arms have been reaching Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon
from Syria; however, UNIFIL has had major difficulty in preventing this. UNIFIL
is only allowed to be stationed in southern Lebanon and can only confiscate
arms if it comes across any, yet UNTSO’s mandate is broad enough to allow a
deployment in the region. In 2007, the UNTSO Chief-of-Staff, Ian Gordon, stated
on the topic of monitoring smuggling on the Lebanese-Syrian border, that
“UNTSO’s unarmed observers, their long-standing reputation for neutrality, and
their good relations with both Beirut and Damascus...could make them a
less-threatening option than UNIFIL.”[xlix]
Another recommendation is that UNTSO
should have more of a focus on the conflict within Israel and the occupied Palestinian
Territories. According to the Arab Peace Initiative, which was adopted in 1996
and reaffirmed in 2002, the Arab states declared that if there was a just
solution to the Palestinian issue, then the countries would “consider the
Arab-Israeli conflict ended,” “enter into a peace agreement with Israel” and
“establish normal relations with Israel.”[l]
Therefore, it is important for UNTSO to begin focusing on the intra-state
conflict within Israel because no other mission is deployed in the state and
although it is a regional conflict, the Palestine issue is at the root of the
tensions and must be acknowledged.
Although UNTSO should maintain its
use of military observers in Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon; the personnel in
Palestine should have different functions (although the use of force should
still be prohibited), while deploying to the West Bank and Gaza strip. Maintaining
the non-use of force is important because it will make it easier for the force
to gain consent and support from the local population and the Israeli
government. The UNTSO personnel should be more proactive and act to monitor
elections, train the Palestinian police, and provide humanitarian aid.
Catherine Barry explains that UN peacekeeping in the Palestinian territories
should follow the example of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG) in Namibia, where personnel were more proactive and did not merely act
as observers.[li] The
UNTAG personnel were involved with electoral assistance, police patrols, reviewing
court decisions, and advocating for the release of political prisoners.[lii]
Similarly in the Palestinian territories, UNTSO should be involved with election
monitoring because the last elections in Palestine faced many difficulties.
Israel was largely criticized for obstructing the 2005 presidential elections
and Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, said that “we
expected the Israelis to offer more facilities for the Palestinian election
process but they did not live up to promises.”[liii]
Elections monitoring is necessary in Gaza as well so that the results of the
election and the government is internationally recognized.
The second recommendation is for
UNTSO to conduct policing and for this civilian police need to be deployed.
These UN police can take conduct patrols and they could take over some of the
check points held by Israel. UNTSO could also monitor arrests and detentions in
the Palestinian territories because “virtually every Palestinian family has a
specific complaint about Israel’s internal security measure.”[liv]
Lastly, UNTSO could assist and help train the Palestinian police, which would
enable the Palestinian government to stabilize the region and create a secure
environment for Israel. This would allow Israel to gain confidence that their
security can be ensured, which could make them more willing to withdraw and advance
an overall political settlement.
In conclusion, UNTSO has played a
significant role in the Middle East and the Observer Mission Model approach has
contributed greatly to the success of the mission. Although conflicts remain,
UNTSO has acted as a deterrent, investigated violations of the agreements, has
supported other peacekeeping missions in the region, and ultimately two peace
agreements have been obtained between Jordan-Israel and Egypt-Israel. The
recommendations that this paper offers are that UNTSO should redeploy to
different areas (Syria/Lebanon border, as well as Palestinian Territories) so
that it can be more effective and take advantage of its limited deployment
restrictions. UNTSO is the best organization to manage the Arab-Israeli
conflict because it has a broad and flexible mandate, since its budget comes
from the UN budget it has a wider pool of financial resources, the personnel
consist of only experienced personnel so they are the most capable of dealing
with difficult regions, and ultimately the UN “is the best forum for the
expression of an international consensus.”[lv]
The fact that it is an observer mission means that it is cost-effective; it
allows UNTSO to be more readily accepted by states, and it is a way for the
Security Council to receive objective reports about the reality on the ground
so that effective resolutions can be passed. Therefore, observer missions are
still an invaluable asset to peacekeeping operations and should continue to be
supported in the region.
[i] Andrew
Gregory Theodore, Watching the War and Keeping the Peace: The United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (untso) in the Middle East, 1949-1956 (Kingston,
Ontario: Queen's University, 2009), http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/jspui/bitstream/1974/1892/1/Theobald_Andrew_G_200905_PhD.pdf (accessed
November 14, 2011). 6.
[ii] (Theodore, ii),
Odd Bull, “Items-in-peace-keeping Operations - Middle East - Untso - United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine,” UN Secretariat
Archives (March 18, 1963): 3.
[iii] William D. Claytor, United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization: History and U.s. Marine Involvement. globalsecurity.org, 1990), page
nr., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/CWD.htm(accessed
November 14, 2011).
[iv] Ibid
[v] “Untso Background,” UNTSO United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/background.shtml (accessed November 14, 2011).
[vi] Handbook On United
Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (New York:
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United
Nations, 2003), page 61.
[vii] Claytor.
[viii] “Untso Background.”
[ix] Claytor.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] William J. Durch, The
Evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis (New
York: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993), page 91.
[xii] Durch, 95.
[xiii] Claytor.
[xiv] Durch, 91.
[xv] Durch, 95.
[xvi] Claytor.
[xvii] Claytor.
[xviii] Nitza Nachmias, “Peacekeeping under
Military Occupation: The Case of Untso and Unrwa,” Canada National
Defence: Peacekeeping 1815 to Today (Proceedings of the XXIst Colloquium of the
International Commission of Military History) (1995): page 441.
[xix] “UNTSO background.”
[xx] Theodore, 5.
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] “UNTSO background.”
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] Nachmias, 442.
[xxv] Christopher W. Murray, “Lebanon:
Untso Observers Could Monitor Syrian Border, Resume Armistice Role,” Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/10/06BEIRUT3245.html# (accessed November 14, 2011).
[xxvi] Bull.
[xxvii] “UNTSO background.”
[xxviii] Richard H. Jones, “Untso Head M.gEn.
Lilley Says Pko Can Leave When Israel Signs Peace Treaties with Syria and
Lebanon,” Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/11/05TELAVIV6262.html# (accessed
November 14, 2011).
[xxix] Nitza Nachmias,
“Untso: Obsolete Peacekeeping?” Peacekeeping and International
Relations 25, no. 1 (Jan 1996).
[xxx] Durch, 33.
[xxxi] Durch, 90.
[xxxii] Durch, 172.
[xxxiii] Durch, 172.
[xxxiv] Durch, 90.
[xxxv] “UNTSO background.”
[xxxvi]
“Untso: Transfer of Computers Via Israel Normal,”
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Jul-08/UNTSO-Transfer-of-computers-via-Israel-normal.ashx#axzz1dWWBrAJn (accessed November 14, 2011).
[xxxvii] Sayyid Nasrallah, “Nasrallah Comments
On the Stl Indictments,” http://qifanabki.com/2011/07/02/nasrallah-comments-on-the-stl-indictments/ (accessed
November 14, 2011)
[xxxviii] Theodore, 16.
[xxxix] Durch, 95.
[xl] Ibid, 95.
[xli] “UNTSO background.”
[xlii]
Jones.
[xliii] Ibid
[xliv] Jones.
[xlv] “UNTSO background.”
[xlvi] Durch, 101.
[xlvii] Claytor.
[xlviii]Advisory Committee On
Administrative and Budgetary Questions Findings and Recommendations Related to
Support Arrangements): (united Nations Truce Supervision Organization
Evaluation Report, 64th ed. (New York: United Nations Publications, 2010-2011), page 245.
[xlix]
Jones.
[l] Brian Whitaker, “The Arab Peace Initiative,”
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm
(accessed November 14, 2011).
[li] Catherine Barry, Designing
a Un Peacekeeping Operation For the Occupied Territories (Washington,
D.C.: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University,
1992).
[lii] Ibid, 7.
[liii] Ibid.
[liv] Barry, 12.
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