Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: Is Domestic Instability to Blame?

Imane Drissi El-Bouzaidi
December 2, 2010
According to Samina Ahmed ‘the internal contradictions in Pakistan’s power structure…continue to be primarily responsible for its nuclear choices.’ Does the history of Pakistan’s nuclear programme attest to Ahmed’s conclusion?

Pakistan’s nuclear policy has long been dictated by the view to which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto expresses that “even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb” (Ahmed 183). The reasons and motivations behind the fact that Pakistanis seem willing to do whatever it takes to acquire nuclear weapons is important to analyze. Samina Ahmed believes that the conflict within Pakistan’s power structure is primarily responsible for their nuclear policy; however this paper will argue differently. History dispels Ahmed’s conclusion because ‘internal contradictions’ were not primarily responsible for determining nuclear policy because the military was almost always dominant over nuclear choices, but rather other factors were more prevalent, namely regional insecurity, international inaction, economic factors, and public opinion.

Although domestic power struggles are not “primarily” responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear choices, it does still play a significant role. Pakistan’s power structure affected the nuclear policy not as Ahmed says because of the “internal contradictions in Pakistan’s power structure” but due to the fact that the military was dominant over the nuclear policy.  None can deny that there have been numerous instances in Pakistan’s history of political struggle between the military and civilian governments but throughout this time, the military has almost always dominated security policy, which includes nuclear policy. Therefore, it is not considered an internal conflict because there was no reasonable force of resistance against the military but rather “it is the political dimension of the nuclear program that has kept Pakistan’s position on the main issues of nuclear debate unaffected by changes in political leadership” (Rais 462). An example of this is in 1977 with the military-led Zia regime, which continued the nuclear program of the Bhutto government even though they had completely different ideologies and views. It was not that there was consensus among all policymakers but that the military was able to suppress those that did not agree to their nuclear policy outlook, such as Nawaz Sharif who was removed from power by the military because he wanted to freeze the enrichment of uranium in exchange for American concessions (Ahmed 190). The military favours a nuclear policy because it helps advance “the armed forces’ institutional interests by legitimizing the existence of a large standing military and a constant increase in defense expenditure” (Ahmed 179). Therefore there was stability with those controlling the security policy so the changes to develop nuclear weapons cannot be attributed to domestic instability but rather to the rule of the military and other factors, which will now be illustrated.

Regional insecurity is the most significant factor affecting nuclear policy. In Ahmed’s argument, she clearly understates the threat of India, saying that it is merely a “bid to divert domestic attention” so that the military can legitimize its rule (Ahmed 182). However, history shows that it is a legitimate threat and that changes in Pakistan’s nuclear policy usually occur as a response to actions taken by India. Three examples are: India’s first nuclear weapons test in 1947 led Pakistan to begin a military nuclear weapons program; when India obtained nuclear-capable missiles, it led to Pakistan enhancing its ballistic missile program in 1988; and lastly, when India moved from ‘nuclear ambiguity’ to ‘overt weaponization,’ Pakistan responded with the testing of the Ghauri ballistic missile (Ahmed 190). These are instances where Pakistan felt it had to enhance its nuclear program in order to equalize and maintain balance in the region. It has also been willing to restrain from proliferation in times of security because “it has quite often made its acceptance of NPT and full-scope safeguards conditional to the acceptance of these measures by India” (Rais 464). In 1995 Pakistan approved the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) when India accepted it and in 1996 Pakistan stated that it would be willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) if India complied. Therefore, it is apparent that Pakistan’s nuclear choices were not a result of a domestic power struggle but rather “the manoeuvrability of Pakistani policymakers was adversely affected because their declaratory nuclear policy became dependent on India’s nuclear choices” (191 Ahmed). Therefore, there was not much that policymakers could do to determine the nuclear policy of Pakistan because regional insecurity was a more significant factor.

Another factor influencing Pakistan’s nuclear policy was international inaction, which was inconsistent and lenient, encouraging the state to develop weapons without fear of serious reprimand. The choice for nuclear weapons was largely a cost-benefit analysis and a rational choice, in which proliferation is assessed to be more beneficial. There are three examples in history that show how the international response influenced Pakistan’s nuclear choices. Firstly, in 1976, in response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, the U.S. enacted the Symington amendment to restrict aid. This was ineffective because there was not an international consensus so loopholes in Western European legislation allowed Pakistan to acquire nuclear technology from Germany and the Netherlands (Ahmed 186). In 1980, relations improved because the USSR invaded Afghanistan so Pakistan chose to continue proliferation because it did not face long-term repercussions for its nuclear policy. As a result, “U.S. credibility has been badly tarnished by inaction in the face of Pakistan’s disregard of U.S. non-proliferation laws” (Spector, Stahl 33). Secondly, when India conducted several nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan chose to assess the international response before conducting similar tests. The fact that there was an “absence of a concerted international response tilted the internal balance in Pakistan in favour of a retaliatory test.” (Ahmed 195). Lastly, a strong international stance also leads Pakistan to question its nuclear policy, which was evident after the 1998 nuclear tests. Sanctions were implemented that had a devastating effect on Pakistan’s economy, which “led to unprecedented internal debate...on the pros and cons of its overt weapons status” (Ahmed 198). Therefore, it is not internal contradictions in the power structure that influences Pakistan’s nuclear choices but the reaction of the international community.

The cost-benefit analysis leads to the discussion of economic motivations as an influential factor in determining Pakistan’s nuclear policy. In her article, Ahmed fails to acknowledge the economic advantage of nuclear energy. This energy source has emerged as an attractive method of meeting Pakistan’s energy demands because the fossil fuel alternative is costly, environmentally harmful, and it has “spillover effects in strengthening scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure” (460 Rais). Rather than importing oil, Pakistan can save up to 40-60% in power generating costs and at the same time diminish its dependence on foreign energy resources.

The last factor that affects Pakistan’s nuclear choices is public opinion. If the public strongly supported the political parties or opposed proliferation then it could have had an effect in preventing the military from gaining dominance or else have had the military adopt an anti-proliferation stance. Haider Nizamani conducted a survey, which shows that there was “significant support for the official position on the broad nature and direction of Pakistan’s nuclear policy in three of Pakistan’s four regions” (p146 Abraham). There was not enough of a resistance to nuclear proliferation in Pakistan because of anti-India sentiments and it came to be associated with national sovereignty as well as national status. A nuclear policy has allowed Pakistan to gain prestige among the Developing countries and especially Muslim countries because the public generally feels that “the Christian West would not allow the Islamic countries to emerge independent, self-reliant, and powerful enough to pursue an effective role in world politics” (461 Rais). Therefore, public opinion is also responsible for nuclear choices.

In conclusion, Ahmed’s argument attributing internal power struggles to Pakistan’s nuclear policy is not a testament reflected in history. Internal contradictions are not evident in Pakistan’s power structure because of the dominance of the military over the nuclear policy but instead other factors are responsible, most especially regional insecurity, but also international inaction, economic motives, and public opinion. As the author, Rasul B. Rais supports, “transition from a civilian to military regime has not affected the nation’s position on nuclear issues,” but instead Pakistan’s nuclear policy is characterized by “a persistent phenomenon of confrontational and action-reaction strategies” (459, 463). Understanding the proper motivations behind nuclear choices is necessary to comprehend before taking the next step, which is analyzing whether or not nuclear proliferation is the best policy for Pakistan.